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The Tail-to-Tooth Ratio (TTR) expresses the 
relationship between the resources or forces employed to 
perform the core missions and the resources or 
infrastructure used to manage and support those forces.  
Several methods are used in DoD to measure the TTR, all of 
which attempt to establish an unambiguous boundary between 
“tail” and “tooth.”  Specific cases and examples confirm 
that such a clear-cut limit does not exist.  On the 
contrary, the definitions of “tail” and “tooth” change with 
the specific situation, the environment and the timing of 
the measurement. 
The lack of a clear boundary suggests that the 
relationship between “tail” and “tooth” should not continue 
to be expressed as a ratio or a mathematical relationship 
between two numbers, but as a continuum.  The “Tail-to-
Tooth Continuum” can be represented in more than one 
dimension in relation to the number of variables used to 
characterize the position of a specific activity on the 
continuum.  
This new approach focuses on outputs and outcomes and 
could prevent the unnecessary labeling of costs, allowing 
management to concentrate on increasing efficiency and 
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The Tail-to-Tooth Ratio (TTR) expresses the 
relationship between the resources or forces employed to 
perform the core missions and the resources or 
infrastructure used to manage and support those forces.  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 establishes a demarcation 
line between forces and infrastructure.  The definitions of 
tooth and tail assumed by DoD from this law are, TOOTH: 
military units assigned to combatant commands, and TAIL: 
administration and force support activities assigned by the 
Secretary of Defense to the military departments, the 
Defense Agencies, civilian contractors or in some special 
cases combatant commands. 
There are three different commonly accepted approaches 
to the definition of TTR: 
1) A comparison of the dollars allocated to the combat 
or fighting capability (“tooth”), and the dollars allocated 
to everything else (“tail”).  This approach in turn uses 
two methods to determine the TTR:  the Force Structure vs. 
Infrastructure method and the Major Force Programs and 
Appropriation Codes method; 
2) A comparison of the relationship between the people 
involved in combat and the people involved in support 
activities; and 
3) A separate TTR for specific procurement programs or 
projects. 
  xx
Due to the corporate world’s focus on profits, it is 
easier to decipher what is “tooth” and what is “tail” 
within this environment than in DoD.  However, even with 
this steady focus on profitability, disagreements still 
arise amongst business leaders regarding how this “tooth” 
and “tail” should be measured.  Several methods are used, 
including absorption costing, variable costing, activity 
based costing and value chain analysis.  Due to the 
intangible nature of DoD’s bottom line, it has become 
increasingly more difficult to define the boundaries 
between “tooth” and “tail.”   
All of the methods used in DoD to measure the TTR 
attempt to establish an unambiguous boundary between “tail” 
and “tooth.”  Specific cases and examples confirm that such 
a clear-cut limit does not exist.  On the contrary, the 
definitions of “tail” and “tooth” change with the specific 
situation, the environment and the timing of the 
measurement. 
A new approach based on a new budgeting system, 
centered on outputs and outcomes instead of inputs, has 
several advantages such as its inherent focus on core 
competencies and core products, and the feasibility of 
evaluating the true costs of operations.  However, it is 
not without weaknesses; its main weakness is that it is 
based on establishing a definite boundary between “tail” 
and “tooth” similar to the other methods. 
Because the demarcation between “tail” and “tooth” is 
not fixed, their relationship should not be expressed as a 
ratio or a mathematical relationship between two numbers, 
but as a continuum.  The “Tail to Tooth Continuum” 
  xxi
developed in this thesis was expanded to two and three 
dimensions, according to the activity’s correlation with 
the core product, the current threat level in a specified 
type of conflict, and finally the relevance of the core 
product to the desired end result in explicit 
circumstances. 
This approach does not imply that DoD, nor any other 
organization should neglect developing its core 
competencies.  The advantage of this approach is that it 
avoids the fruitless labeling of costs, allowing management 
to concentrate on increasing efficiency and reducing the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
This research determines the key factors involved in 
calculating the Tail to Tooth Ratio (TTR); and analyzes the 
influence that the current top management intent on 
decreasing the TTR has had on the United States Department 
of Defense (DoD) operational readiness and expenditure 
efficiency (if such influence exists).  DoD’s top civilian 
management and the leaders of the uniformed services have 
expressed their commitment to reducing the “tail” in the 
TTR to alleviate the imbalance between infrastructure and 
force structure. However, a well-known management principle 
states that costs have to be understood and measured before 
they can be managed. Without a clear definition of “tail” 
and “tooth,” it would be impossible to ascertain whether a 
reduction in the “tail” truly leads to increases in 
efficiency and readiness.  As Sherlock Holmes said, “it is 
a capital mistake to theorize before one has data [Ref. 41, 
p. 57].”  Therein resides the importance of this thesis. 
The specific goal of this research is to provide DoD 
top management, Service leaders and acquisition program 
managers with a clearer understanding of the implications 
of the TTR, its value as a measure of operational readiness 
and military expenditure efficiency and the role it should 
play in determining budget appropriations. 
  2 
B. BACKGROUND 
Over the centuries, organizations have looked for ways 
to measure effectiveness and efficiency.  This has often 
been a difficult and laborious task.  Competitive 
effectiveness is defined as the level of expected output 
actually achieved, while operating efficiency is related to 
how many resources were consumed to achieve the actual 
output.  Often it is left up to the organization to decide 
what effectiveness and efficiency measures are appropriate. 
DoD has widely used “Tail to Tooth Ratio” as an 
indicator of operating efficiency.  It is used to measure 
the ratio between the dollars that are allocated to the 
combat capability (“tooth”) and the dollars that are 
allocated to everything else (“tail”).  However, while the 
concept is widely accepted the specific definitions of 
“tail” and “tooth” are not.  Each service within DoD has 
its own definition of what elements constitute “tail” and 
“tooth.”   In recent years, the common perception 
throughout DoD is that the TTR is overly skewed towards the 
“tail;” both DoD and taxpayers view this as an inefficient 
use of funds. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is: Is 
the TTR an appropriate measure of operational readiness and 
military expenditure efficiency? Secondary research 
questions are: 
1. What elements should be considered “tail” or “tooth” 
in determining the TTR? 
  3 
2. What factors have influenced the change of the TTR 
over the past centuries? 
3. What is the effect of current technological advances 
on the TTR? 
4. Is there a direct relationship between operational 
readiness and TTR? 
5. Should DoD continue to pursue a reduction in the 
“tail” of all its programs? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis will include: 
1. An in-depth examination of how the TTR is currently 
determined. 
2. A comparative analysis of TTR calculations in DoD 
and in the corporate world. 
3. The authors’ opinion of what should be considered 
“tail” or “tooth” at the activity, program or 
program element level.  
4. A description of how the TTR has changed over the 
centuries.   
5. An analysis of how the current emphasis on unmanned 
vehicles/stand-off weapons may influence a specific 
program’s TTR. 
6. A study of the relationship between TTR and 
operational readiness for a specific program. 
7. A review of current Department of the Navy (DoN) 
major cost reduction programs in relation to their 
impact on TTR. 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used by the authors to complete this 
thesis research consisted of the following steps. 
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1. Literature search of books, magazine articles, 
journals, World Wide Web, DOD references, and other 
library information resources. 
2. Review of applicable Policies, Norms and Regulations 
from DoD, JCS and the Service Chiefs. 
3. Review of TTR calculations in different 
corporations. 
4. Use of appropriate models to evaluate the impact of 
specific emergent technologies or logistic theories 
on the TTR of specified programs. 
5. Review of current DoN major programs. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I. Introduction: identifies the purpose of 
this thesis and reviews the background as well as the 
primary and subsidiary research questions. 
Chapter II. Determination of the Tail to Tooth Ratio:  
provides the reader with a basic understanding of the 
factors involved in determining the TTR and the current DoD 
norms and policies about calculating this ratio. 
Chapter III. Historical perspective of the TTR:  
presents a historical perspective of how the TTR has 
changed over the centuries and an economic/financial 
interpretation of such changes. 
Chapter IV. An analysis of the influence of 
technological advances in the TTR: analyzes the influence 
of some technological advances, like unmanned vehicles and 
stand-off weapons, on the life cycle costs of a program and 
on the breakdown between “tooth” and “tail” costs.  
Chapter V. A study of the relationship between TTR and 
operational readiness: scrutinizes how the efficiency and 
  5 
structure of the logistics chain influences the TTR and the 
relationship between TTR and operational readiness in a 
specified program. 
Chapter VI. A comparative analysis within the 
corporate world: studies how the TTR is currently 
determined in the corporate world. 
Chapter VII. A new approach to the TTR: analyzes the 
variations of the boundary between “tail” and “tooth” 
according to different circumstances, the possibility of 
integrating the corporate and DoD approaches to calculate 
the TTR to form a more accurate measure, and introduces a 
new concept for the definition of “tail” and “tooth.”   
Chapter VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations: 
summarizes the research findings, answers the research 
questions and presents some areas of further research. 
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II. DETERMINATION OF THE TAIL TO TOOTH RATIO  
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter describes the factors involved in 
determining the TTR and the current DoD processes and 
policies on the subject of calculating this ratio. 
In general, the TTR expresses the relationship between 
the resources or forces employed to perform the core 
missions and the resources or infrastructure used to manage 
and support those forces.  Defense experts normally refer 
to the “tail” as those non-combat activities and support 
services, which operate from fixed locations. However, as 
our analysis will show, this definition is still fuzzy; 
while the general concept of the TTR is apparently clear, 
the specific definitions of “tail” and “tooth” are not.   
Not only are there several approaches to defining what 
elements constitute “tail” and “tooth,” but there are also 
differences in the valuation variables of the actual TTR 
calculation, i.e. dollars, number of people, or number of 
systems.  These differing viewpoints exist not only between 
non-DoD entities and DoD management, but also within each 
of the Services.  
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 addresses the separation of 
combat and support commands. The Act requires that the 
Secretaries of the military departments assign all forces 
under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant 
commands according to the force structure prescribed by the 
President. On the other hand, the military departments, 
  8 
subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 
Secretary of Defense, are responsible for the activities 
that create, manage and support the forces assigned by them 
to a combatant command [Ref. 14, Chapter 6]. 
DoD has used the Goldwater-Nichols Act to establish a 
separation boundary between “tooth” and “tail.” “This 
feature of U.S. law provides the demarcation line between 
forces (military units assigned to combatant commanders) 
and infrastructure (activities retained by the military 
departments)” [Ref. 39, p. 184].   
This chapter will show that the definitions of force 
structure and infrastructure used in the DoD and some U.S. 
Governmental and Non-Governmental agencies, are not always 
consistent with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and in some 
cases the approaches are completely different. 
B. CURRENT PROCESSES/POLICIES REGARDING TAIL TO TOOTH 
RATIO MEASUREMENT 
To arrive at a comprehensive list of the elements that 
constitute the “tail” and the “tooth,” the authors searched 
documents and publications from DoD, Congress, and diverse 
organizations.  They examined concepts, testimonies, 
speeches, statements, and interviews released by top DoD 
management and Service leaders. 
The goal was to integrate these policies and opinions 
into one single definition of TTR.  The results of the 
search confirmed that there were three completely different 
approaches to the definition of TTR. 
1) A comparison of the cost of the fighting forces 
versus the cost of support structures [Ref. 36, 39, 40]; 
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2) A comparison of the relationship between the people 
involved in combat and the people in support activities 
[Ref. 36, 49]; and 
3) A separate TTR for each specific procurement 
program or project [Ref. 48].  
Instead of attempting to integrate these approaches 
into one single definition, the three methodologies are 
presented in detail in the following sections. 
1. Cost of Fighting Forces Versus Support Structures  
This approach measures the ratio between the dollars 
that are allocated to the combat or fighting capability 
(“tooth”), and the dollars that are allocated to everything 
else (“tail”).  However, this definition has the same 
fundamental problem previously discussed, i.e. how to 
calculate the percentage of the budget that corresponds to 
“tooth” and what percentage corresponds to “tail.”  Two 
methods will be examined to determine the TTR:  The Force 
Structure versus Infrastructure approach and the Major 
Force Programs and Appropriation Codes approach. 
a) Force Structure vs. Infrastructure Approach 
Section 118, Chapter 2, Title 10, of the United 
States Code (USC) mandates that every four years the 
Secretary of Defense shall: “conduct a comprehensive 
examination (to be known as a ‘Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR)’) of the national defense strategy, force structure, 
force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plans, 
and other elements of the defense program and policies of 
the United States” [Ref.28: SEC. 901].  One of the aspects 
that must be included in the aforementioned report is: 
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(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces 
to support forces (commonly referred to as the 
'tooth-to-tail' ratio) under the national defense 
strategy, including, in particular, the 
appropriate number and size of headquarters units 
and Defense Agencies for that purpose. 
The definitions of force structure and 
infrastructure adopted by DoD are based on a Bottom-Up 
Review conducted in 1993 and a publication from the 
Institute for Defense Analyses titled ‘A Reference Manual 
for Defense Mission Categories, Infrastructure Categories, 
and Program Elements’ (originally prepared for the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense in 1991 and updated in 1995). 
These definitions were also used in the 1997 QDR and in 
subsequent Future Years Defense Programs (FYDP) [Ref. 40, 
Appendix L].  
The 1997 QDR establishes a separation between 
force structure and force infrastructure, and equates the 
latter with support functions or “tail:”   
The DoD infrastructure includes a diverse 
set of activities… …among them are installations 
for the operating forces, training programs for 
military personnel, logistics support, central 
personnel services, and headquarters functions. 
In addition… medical care for active duty and 
retired military personnel and their family 
members, and… functions related to science and 
technology programs and central command, control, 
and communications services. [Ref. 36]  
The 1997 QDR additionally sub-divides the 
infrastructure into Defense Agency/Defense-Wide 
infrastructure and Military Department infrastructure. The 
Defense Agency/Defense-Wide infrastructure is defined as 
those Defense agencies and defense-wide activities that 
carry out service and supply functions common to more than 
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one DoD component.  Also encompassed are those centralized 
organizations and programs that provide services ranging 
from intelligence operations to commissaries, and from 
health care to research and development. 
On the other hand, the Military Department 
infrastructure is comprised of resources and activities, 
such as resources for managing defense forces, facilities 
from which defense forces operate, non-unit training, and 
personnel support. The military department infrastructure 
also consists of acquisition support (including science and 
technology efforts as well as testing and evaluation) and 
C4I programs (command, control, communications, computer, 
and intelligence systems).   
Although the basic definition of mission 
categories and infrastructure categories remain the same, 
the actual number of categories and the program elements 
that are assigned to each category have varied from year to 
year.  As the role of the Armed Forces has changed over the 
years, the interpretation regarding which program elements 
in the FYDP should be associated with mission forces and 
which with infrastructure activities has changed 
accordingly. 
The following tables, based on the Annual Reports 
to Congress and the President, illustrate the changes in 
DoD’s definitions of mission/force categories and 
infrastructure categories between 1995 and 2002. 
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Table 2-1, Changes in the Force or Mission Categories 
1995 2002 
Combat Forces:  programs associated 
with military combat units, such as 
heavy divisions, tactical aircraft 
squadrons, and aircraft carriers. 
 
 
Direct Support Forces:  programs 
associated with support units that 
deploy with combat forces, such as 
corps-level support, tanker 
aircraft squadrons, and naval 
replenishment ships. 
 
Expeditionary Forces:  Operating 
forces designed primarily for non-
nuclear operations outside the 
United States. Includes combat 
units (and their organic support) 
such as divisions, tactical 
aircraft squadrons, and aircraft 
carriers. 
 
 Homeland Defense:  Operating forces 
designed primarily to deter or 
defeat direct attacks on the United 
States and its territories. Also 
includes those agencies engaged in 
U.S. international policy 
activities under the direct 
supervision of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. 
Other Forces: Includes most 
intelligence, space, and combat-
related command, control, and 
communications (C3) programs, such 
as cryptologic activities, 
satellite communications, and 
airborne command posts. 
Other Forces:  Includes most 
intelligence, space, and combat-
related command, control, and 
communications programs, such as 
cryptologic activities, satellite 
communications, and airborne 
command posts. 
[After Ref.40 Appendix L; Ref. 39, Appendix D, p. 184] 
 
Table 2-2, Changes in Infrastructure Categories 
1995 2002 
Acquisition Infrastructure: Program 
elements that support program 
management, program offices, and 
production support, including 
acquisition headquarters, science 
and technology, and test and 
evaluation resources. This category 
includes earlier levels of research 
and development, including basic 
research, exploratory development, 
and advanced development. 
Acquisition Infrastructure:  
Activities that develop, test, 
evaluate, and manage the 
acquisition of military equipment 
and supporting systems. These 
activities also provide technical 
oversight throughout a system’s 
useful life. 
C3 Infrastructure:  Programs that 
manage all aspects of the command, 
control, and communications 
infrastructure for DOD facilities, 
Communications and Information 
Infrastructure:  Programs that 
provide secure information 
distribution, processing, storage, 
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1995 2002 
information support services, 
mapping and charting products, and 
security support. This category 
includes program elements that 
provide non-tactical telephone 
services, the General Defense 
Intelligence Program and 
cryptological activities, the 
Global Positioning System, and 
support of air traffic control 
facilities. 
and display. Major elements include 
long-haul communications systems, 
base computing systems, Defense 
Enterprise Computing Centers and 
detachments, and information 
assurance programs. 
Central Logistics:  Programs that 
provide support to centrally 
managed logistics organizations, 
including the management of 
material, operation of supply 
systems, maintenance activities, 
material transportation, base 
operations and support, 
communications, and minor 
construction. This category also 
includes program elements that 
provide resources for commissaries 
and military exchange operations. 
Central Logistics:  Programs that 
provide supplies, depot-level 
maintenance of military equipment 
and supporting systems, 
transportation of material, and 
other products and services to 
customers throughout DoD. 
 
Central Medical:  Programs that 
furnish funding, equipment, and 
personnel that provide medical care 
to active military personnel, 
dependents, and retirees. 
Activities provide for all patient 
care, except for that provided by 
medical units that are part of 
direct support units. Activities 
include medical training, 
management of the medical system, 
and support of medical 
installations. 
Defense Health Program (DHP):  
Medical infrastructure and systems, 
managed by the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Health Affairs, that 
provide health care to military 
personnel, dependents, and 
retirees. 
Central Personnel: All programs 
that provide for the recruiting of 
new personnel and the management 
and support of dependent schools, 
community, youth, and family 
centers, and child development 
activities. Other programs 
supporting personnel include 
permanent change of station costs, 
personnel in transit, civilian 
disability compensation, veterans 
Central Personnel Administration:  
Programs that acquire and 
administer the DoD workforce. 
Includes acquisition of new DoD 
personnel, station assignments, 
provision of the appropriate number 
of skilled people for each career 
field, and miscellaneous personnel 
management support functions, such 
as personnel transient and holding 
accounts. 
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1995 2002 
disability compensation, veterans 
education assistance, and other 
miscellaneous personnel support 
activities. 
Central Personnel Benefits 
Programs:  Programs that provide 
benefits to service members. 
Includes family housing programs; 
commissaries and military 
exchanges; dependent schools in the 
United States and abroad; 
community, youth, and family 
centers; child development 
activities; off-duty and voluntary 
education programs; and a variety 
of ceremonial and morale-boosting 
activities. 
Central Training:  consists of 
program elements that provide 
resources for virtually all non-
unit training, including training 
for new personnel, aviation and 
flight training, military 
academies, officer training corps, 
other college commissioning 
programs, and officer and enlisted 
training schools. 
Central Training:  Programs that 
provide formal training to 
personnel at central locations away 
from their duty stations (non-unit 
training). Includes training of new 
personnel, officer training and 
service academies, aviation and 
flight training, and military 
professional and skill training. 
Also includes miscellaneous other 
training-related support functions. 
Force Management:  consists of all 
programs that provide funding, 
equipment, and personnel for the 
management and operation of all the 
major military command headquarters 
activities. Force management also 
includes program elements that 
provide resources for defense-wide 
departmental headquarters, 
management of international 
programs, support to other defense 
organizations and federal 
government agencies, security 
investigative services, public 
affairs activities, and criminal 
and judicial activities. 
Departmental Management:  
Headquarters whose primary mission 
is to manage the overall programs 
and operations of the DoD and its 
components. Includes 
administrative, force, and 
international management 
headquarters, and defense-wide 
support activities that are 
centrally managed. Excludes 
headquarters elements exercising 
operational command (which are 
assigned to the Other Forces 
category) and those management 
headquarters that are associated 
with other infrastructure 
categories. 
Installation Support:  consists of 
activities that furnish funding, 
equipment, and personnel to provide 
facilities from which defense 
forces operate. Activities include 
construction planning and design, 
real property maintenance, base 
operating support, real estate 
management for active and reserve 
bases, family housing and bachelor 
housing, supply operations, base 
Force Installations:  Installations 
at which combat units are based. 
Includes the services and 
organizations at these 
installations necessary to house 
and sustain the units and support 
their daily operations. Also 
includes programs to sustain, 
restore, and modernize buildings at 
the installations and protect the 
environment. 
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1995 2002 
closure activities, and 
environmental programs. 
 Other Infrastructure:  These 
programs do not fit well into other 
categories. They include programs 
that (1) provide management, 
basing, and operating support for 
DoD intelligence activities; (2) 
conduct navigation, meteorological, 
and oceanographic activities; (3) 
manage and upgrade DoD-operated air 
traffic control activities; (4) 
support warfighting, wargaming, 
battle centers, and major modeling 
and simulation programs; (5) 
conduct medical contingency 
preparedness activities not part of 
the DHP; and (6) fund CINC-
sponsored or JCS-directed joint 
exercises. Also included in this 
category are centralized resource 
adjustments that are not allocated 
among the programs affected (e.g., 
foreign currency fluctuations, 
commissary resale stocks, and force 
structure deviations). 
 Science and Technology Program:  
The program of scientific research 
and experimentation within the DoD 
that seeks to advance fundamental 
science relevant to military needs 
and determine if the results can be 
successfully applied to military 
use. 
[After Ref.39, Appendix D, pp. 184,185; Ref.46; Ref.52, Appendix II, 
pp. 47,48] 
In summary, force structure is associated with 
components directly related to mission, i.e. aircraft 
squadrons, ships, weapons, infantry units, etc.  Force 
infrastructure is related to activities that provide 
services to mission programs and operate mainly from fixed 
locations i.e. payroll, training, recruiting, travel, 
education, data processing, staff, military construction, 
housing, inventory management, transportation, depot 
maintenance, etc.  When force allocations are reduced there 
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is a direct effect on mission accomplishment and 
capability.  When infrastructure allocations are reduced 
there may be a direct or indirect effect on mission 
effectiveness [Ref.46]. 
b) Major Force Programs and Program Elements 
(PE) 
The concept of TTR is also associated with the 
Major Force Programs (MFPs) and Program Elements (PE).  
There are 11 MFPs created as a measurement and 
control system for the Defense Budget. They allow the 
establishment of prioritized objectives (needed 
capabilities) and the measurement of the progress towards 
those objectives, while matching defense missions (outputs) 
with defense resources (inputs). The initial objective of 
the MFPs was to increase the supervision of the budget by 
producing a number of common categories of defense 
programs, which crossed Service lines (Figure 2-1). Each 
MFP contained the resources needed to achieve an objective 
or plan, but each service controlled the portion of the 
MFPs relating to their particular mission [Ref. 49, p. 42, 
79], [Ref. 23, p. 6].  
The initial MFPs were instituted in 1961 and were 
clearly related to the principal missions the Armed Forces 
needed to perform [Ref. 23, p. 4]. However, contrary to the 
recent modifications and additions made to the Mission and 
Infrastructure Categories shown in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2, 
the only “major” change to the MFPs since their 
introduction was adding the Special Operations Forces 
Program in 1987, mandated by the Cohen-Nunn amendment to 
the DoD Reorganization Act. 
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Program 1 - Strategic Forces
Program 2 - General Purpose Forces
Program 3 - Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence and Space
Program 4 - Mobility Forces
Program 5 - Guard and Reserve Forces
Program 6 - Research and Development
Program 7 - Central Supply and Maintenance
Program 8 - Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities
Program 9 - Administration and Associated Activities
Program 10 - Support of Other Nations
Program 11 - Special Operations Forces
 
Figure 2-1, MFP Structure  
(From Ref. 23, p. 6) 
Each MFP specifies a mix of capabilities and 
contains numerous systems performing specific missions; 
these building blocks are referred to as Program Elements 
(PEs).  Each PE represents a mission or a support function 
of a Joint Program, Service, or Defense Agency.  A PE 
documents all the resources necessary to complete a 
program, such as forces (development, construction, 
procurement or operation of ships, planes, tanks, etc), 
manpower (military or civilian) and dollars (Total 
Obligational Authority (TOA)).  There are approximately 
5,000 to 6,000 PEs, most of which belong to the Services 
[Ref. 49, p. 41], [Ref. 29]. 
The following are the definitions of the Major 
Force Programs as stated by the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) Web based course “Financial Management in the Armed 
Forces.” 
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(1) Strategic Forces: this program includes 
those forces, offensive or defensive, whose missions 
encompass intercontinental or transoceanic inter-theater 
responsibilities.  It contains the operational management 
headquarters, the intelligence and communications 
functions, logistics, and support organizations 
identifiable and associated with the program or mission.  
(2) General Purpose Forces: forces whose 
mission responsibilities are, at a given point in time, 
limited to one theater of operation. This program includes 
command, logistics, intelligence and communications 
organizations/functions associated or organic to these 
forces; and the related support units that are deployed as 
a constituent part of these organizations.   This program 
also comprises other sub-programs, such as JCS-directed and 
coordinated exercises, Coast Guard ship support program, 
war reserve material, ammunition, and equipment. 
(3) Command, Control, Communications, 
Intelligence and Space: comprises intelligence, security, 
communications and functions, such as mapping, charting, 
and geodesy activities, weather service, oceanography, 
special activities, nuclear weapons operations, space 
boosters, satellite control and aerial targets.  As 
mentioned in previous programs, the intelligence and 
communications functions that are specifically identifiable 
to a mission shall be included within the appropriate 
program.  
(4) Mobility Forces: comprises airlift, 
sealift, traffic management, and water terminal activities, 
both direct-funded and through the Defense Working Capital 
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Fund (DWCF), including command, logistics, and support 
units organic to these forces.  
(5) Guard and Reserve Forces: consists 
mainly of Guard and Reserve training units in support of 
strategic, offensive, defensive and general purpose forces. 
There are also units that support intelligence and 
communications; space; airlift and sealift; research and 
development; central supply and maintenance; training, 
medical, general personnel activities, administration, and 
assistance to other nations. 
(6) Research and Development: comprises all 
research and development programs and activities that have 
not yet been approved for operational use.  It includes 
basic and applied research tasks and development; and test 
and evaluation of new weapons systems equipment and related 
programs.  
(7) Central Supply and Maintenance: this 
program includes resources related to supply, maintenance, 
and service functions or activities necessary to fulfill 
DoD programs, both direct-funded and through the DWCF, such 
as first and second destination transportation, overseas 
port units, industrial preparedness, commissaries, 
logistics and maintenance support, depot maintenance and 
supply management.  These functions are usually centrally 
managed. 
(8) Training, Medical, and Other General 
Personnel Activities: comprises resources, functions and 
activities related to training and education, personnel 
procurement services, health care, permanent change of 
station (PCS) travel, transients, family housing, and other 
support activities associated with personnel.  The 
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functions and activities in this program are mainly 
centrally managed. 
Excluded from this program are: 
(a) Training specifically related to 
and identified with another major organic program. 
(b) Housing subsistence, health care, 
recreation, and similar costs and resources, such as base 
operations, which are organic to a program element and are 
included in other major programs. 
(9) Administration and Associated 
Activities: comprises resources for the administrative 
support of departmental and major administrative 
headquarters, field commands, and administration and 
associated activities not specifically identifiable to a 
mission in any of the other major programs.  Included in 
this program are activities such as construction planning 
and design, public affairs, contingencies, claims, and 
criminal investigations.  
(10) Support of Other Nations: resources in 
support of international activities, including the Military 
Assistance Program (MAP), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) infrastructure, 
and humanitarian assistance.  
(11) Special Operations Forces: comprises 
force-oriented special operations forces (Active, Guard and 
Reserve), including the command organizations and support 
units directly related to these forces. 
The above approach further illustrates the 
various interpretations of tooth and tail within DoD.  For 
example, the NPS Web based course [Ref. 29] considers 
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programs 1 through 5 and 11 as “combat forces programs” or 
tooth, while the U.S. Commission on National Security 
considers that only programs 1, 2 and 11 are military 
“forces” or tooth. [Ref. 49, p. 79]  All other programs are 
considered “defense support activities.”   
 When this method is used, it is assumed that all 
PEs within each MFP are homogeneous.  For example, if the 
MFP is considered a “tooth” program then the PEs contained 
within this program are also “tooth.” 
2. TTR Relationship to Combat and Support Personnel 
While most definitions of TTR are based on dollar 
amounts, some approaches only take into account the number 
of military personnel (Soldiers, Sailors and Marines) 
assigned to actual combat positions vs. the rest of the 
members of DoD, or in other words the ratio of combat 
manpower to support manpower. 
Regarding the “tooth to tail ratio,” the 1997’s QDR 
expressed: 
The organizations that performed 
[infrastructure] functions accounted for 48 
percent of total DoD employment (military and 
civilian) in FY 1997.  In addition, 7 percent of 
DoD employees provide medical care for active 
duty and retired military personnel and their 
family members, and another 6 percent perform 
functions related to science and technology 
programs and central command, control, and 
communications services.  In sum, 61 percent of 
people employed by the Department in FY 1997 are 
performing infrastructure functions. [Ref. 36] 
Other studies present a much worse situation.  For 
example, according to the U.S. Commission on National 
Security: 
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DoD’s “tail-to-tooth” ratio is too large by 
any measure.  Nearly 30 “division-equivalents” of 
support personnel (approximately 450,000 people) 
perform service and support functions similar to 
jobs in the civilian sector.  The sharp end of 
the spear, the “teeth”… … constitutes barely 
200,000 warfighters out of DoD’s 2.0 million 
full-time military and civilian personnel.  That 
means that there are almost four DoD civilians 
for every uniformed soldier, sailor, airman, or 
marine in the active combat units.  There are 
also nearly five uniformed military personnel in 
the “tail” for every individual assigned combat 
duty. [Ref. 49, p. 20]. 
As with the infrastructure and MFP approaches, the 
personnel approach also shows various methods of 
interpretation, leading to variances in the calculation of 
the TTR; hence, the variability in the definition of TTR. 
3. Procurement Programs and Projects 
The third approach is to define a separate TTR for 
each specific procurement program and project.  For 
example, besides the acquisition or unit cost (the 
“tooth”), each platform or weapon system carries with it 
several other costs (the “tail”).  These costs consist of 
the operating crew, the maintenance crew, training, and 
infrastructure and logistics support.   The “tail” cost per 
unit is determined by dividing the total cost of the “tail” 
items within the program by the number of units acquired. 
A memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology) states: 
Defense Systems Total Ownership Cost (TOC) 
is defined as Life Cycle Cost (LCC).  LCC (per 
DoD 5000.4M) includes not only acquisition 
program direct costs, but also the indirect costs 
attributable to the acquisition program (i.e., 
costs that would not occur if the program did not 
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exist).  For example, indirect costs would 
include the infrastructure that plans, manages, 
and executes a program over its full life and 
common support items and systems. [Ref. 48] 
This approach is conceptually different than the ones 
previously discussed, because anything that is not a part 
of the equipment acquisition cost is considered tail.  Even 
the military personnel whose jobs it will be to employ the 
system in combat missions are regarded as tail.  This 
methodology is closely related to the Total Ownership Cost 
(TOC) approach. 
In the TOC approach, the tail combines all elements 
that represent the total logistics burden of a system on a 
tactical unit in the field/fleet; including facilities, 
training, fuel & ammo consumption, manpower requirements, 
publications, preventative & corrective maintenance, 
support equipment, etc.  Some of these costs are determined 
by design early in the acquisition cycle and some of these 
costs can be managed in the field/fleet. 
All these post-deployment operations and support costs 
normally represent 65% to 80% of the system LCC or TOC. 
[Ref. 24] 
C. CURRENT TTR IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
1. Calculation Using the Force Structure vs. Force 
Infrastructure Approach  
As discussed in section II.B.1.a), this is the 
approach employed by DoD in the Annual Reports to Congress 
and the President.  The following graph (Figure 2-2) and 
Table A - 1 Appendix A are based on the Annual Report of 
2002 [Ref. 39, Table D-1].  These references show the 
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variations of the force infrastructure categories from 1998 
to 2002 (in percentages and in FY 2003 $Billions).  Figure 
2-2 is a percentage stacked line graph. It also presents 
the four components of force structure stacked above the 
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Figure 2-2, Variations in Force Structure and Force Infrastructure 
Categories 
As Figure 2-2 shows, the portions of the budget 
associated either with mission or with support activities 
have remained relatively constant in the last five years. 
However, the graph shows that a redistribution of the 
budget is taking place within the Force Structure 
categories, and the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) 
is absorbing a significant percentage of the force 
structure appropriations. 
According to the United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO), this approach does not account for all DoD 
infrastructure related programs:  
There are parts of the total infrastructure 
funding that cannot be clearly identified in the 
FYDP, according to DOD officials.  These funds 
pay for goods and services sold by the Defense 
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Business Operations Fund (DBOF) activities.  The 
officials estimate that this is about 20 to 25% 
of DOD’s total infrastructure and mostly 
represents logistics purchases, which cannot be 
specifically identified [Ref. 52, p.3] 
The difficulty in identifying all infrastructure 
funding results from the fact that some agencies or 
activities derive a portion of their funding from the goods 
and services they sell to other DoD programs. As a result, 
some infrastructure costs are included in defense 
activities’ budgets that are normally considered as force 
programs [Ref. 52, pp. 3-6]. This situation is common for 
activities that are a part of the Defense Working Capital 
Fund (DWCF) (formerly known as DBOF). 
The amount of the force programs’ budgets that 
resulted in infrastructure costs for the fiscal year 1995 
FYDP (1995- 1999), was estimated by the Office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to be between $28 and $39 
billion in FY1996 dollars [Ref. 52, p. 4]. If this estimate 
is valid, the costs of infrastructure as shown in Figure 2-
2, are understated and only represent about 75 % of the 
total infrastructure funding (this is the approach followed 
by the GAO). 
More recent estimates show that the total orders 
generated from DoD components which provide funding for the 
DWCF budget actually oscillate between $20.5 and $21 
billion in FY 2003 dollars (see Table A - 4, Appendix A). 
This represents a drastic reduction from the GAO estimates.  
With these values, the costs of infrastructure displayed in 
Figure 2-2 actually represent approximately 86% of the real 
infrastructure funding. Furthermore, the budget of the DWCF 
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originates from orders from “all” DoD components and not 
only from “force” components. Subsequently, a more suitable 
approach would be to allocate the DWCF costs between the 
forces and infrastructure components according to their 
respective weight in the total budget.  
Figure 2-3 shows the variations in the infrastructure 
costs as a percentage of the TOA. The lowest line 
corresponds to the total infrastructure values shown in 
Figure 2-2.  The second line from the bottom shows the 
infrastructure when the DWCF costs are allocated (or 
divided) between forces and infrastructure.  The third line 
shows that the infrastructure costs would represent 50% to 
53% of TOA, if the concept that all DWCF costs have their 
origin only in force programs is presumed valid.  The last 
line reflects that the costs of infrastructure vary from 












































Figure 2-3, Variations in Infrastructure According to the Allocation of 
DWCF 
Finally, Figure 2-4 and Figure 2-5 show the year to 
year percentage increase (or reduction) of the TOA, force 
structure categories and total force infrastructure.  With 
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the exception of the transition from FY1999 to FY2000, the 
total appropriation to “forces categories” has consistently 
grown at a higher rate than the total appropriations to 
“infrastructure categories.” The fastest growing force 
structure categories are Homeland Defense Forces and the 
DERF (not shown in Figure 2-5 because the increment from 
FY2001 to FY2002 is infinite).  On the contrary, the “Other 
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Figure 2-5, Percentage Yearly Variation in the “Force Categories” 
Budget 
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2. Calculation Using MFPs Approach 
Section II.B.1.b) defined a MFP as an aggregation of 
PEs that reflects a DoD force mission or support mission.  
Consequently, DOD uses the Major Force Programs approach to 
appraise the allocation of funds between “infrastructure” 
and “forces.”  However, current MFPs in the Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) do not offer a 
useful base for this type of analysis nor do they offer a 
clear distinction between activities that are truly 
“forces” and activities that are “combat support” or 
“service support.”   Some studies also state that most PEs 
are outdated and many are assigned to the wrong MFPs with 
the result that meaningful analyses across MFPs are 
difficult, and often misleading. [Ref. 49, p. 41]  
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Figure 2-6, Combat Forces MFPs Vs. Infrastructure MFPs 
 
As was also mentioned in section II.B.1.b), some 
approaches consider programs 1 through 5 and 11 as “combat 
forces programs.”  If those approaches are accepted, then 
the “infrastructure” programs will amount to approximately 
36% to 40% of TOA for FY1998 to FY2002 as shown in Figure 
2-6 and Table A - 2, Appendix A.  Figure 2-7 shows the 
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budget appropriation distribution within these 6 MFPs 













































































Figure 2-8, Variations in Infrastructure According to the Allocation of 
DWCF Between the MFPs 
The argument presented in the last section about some 
agencies deriving a portion of their funding from the goods 
and services they sell to other DoD programs is also valid 
here. In this case, some infrastructure costs can be 
included in MFPs normally considered as “combat forces 
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programs.”  The method used to allocate the DWCF between 
the “combat force programs” and the “defense support 
activities” will influence the total amount of the budget 
that is considered “infrastructure.”  Figure 2-8 shows that 
“Total Infrastructure” can vary up to 12% depending on the 
method used to allocate the orders from DoD Components to 
the DWCF. 
Applying the concept that only three (Strategic, 
General Purpose and Special Operation Forces) of the 
current eleven MFPs focus on military “forces,” while the 
remainder include defense support activities, changes 
drastically the relationship between “forces” and 
“infrastructure.”  Figure 2-9 and Table A - 1, Appendix A 
show that approximately 60% to 62% of the budget would be 



























Figure 2-9, Combat Forces MFPs Vs. Infrastructure MFPs 
 
Figure 2-10 shows the budget appropriation 
distribution within the 3 MFPs considered as “combat forces 
programs” in this case. 



























Figure 2-10, Appropriation Distribution within Combat Forces MFPs 
 
The same analysis of the past sections for the 
allocation of the orders from DoD Components to the DWCF 
applies in this case.  Figure 2-11 shows that now the 
percentage of the budget that could be considered 












































Figure 2-11, Variations in Infrastructure According to the Allocation 
of DWCF Between the MFPs 
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3. Calculation Using Personnel Approach 
The current DoD approach for measuring the ratio of 
combat manpower to support manpower uses the same force and 
infrastructure categories from the FYDP described in 
section II.B.1.a), Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 [Ref. 40, Table 
D-2].  Figure 2-12 and Table A - 5, Appendix A show the 
variation of this ratio for the Active-Duty Military and 
Civilian personnel in the last five years (excluding 



























Figure 2-12, Combat Manpower vs. Support Manpower 
 
Using the same force and infrastructure categories 
mentioned above, Figure 2-13 further specifies the ratio of 
combat manpower to support manpower for each of the 
Services, Defense Agencies and Defense-Wide personnel. As 
expected, most personnel in Defense-Agencies and Defense 
Wide activities are considered “tail.” On the other hand, 
between 50% to 55% of the members of the Marine Corps and 
the Army are regarded as “tooth.” The Navy and the Air 
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Force are located in an intermediate position with a 





































Figure 2-13, Ratio of Combat Manpower to Total Manpower by Services 
 
Not all analyses agree with these numbers. According 
to the GAO, “DOD may not be accurately accounting for all 
personnel assigned to OSD.  Some personnel temporarily 
assigned to OSD by other DOD components are functioning 
more as permanent staff and are not being reported as OSD 
personnel.” [Ref. 53, p.3] The GAO also reported that there 
are inconsistencies amongst the service components in the 
type of positions that are designated as headquarters [Ref. 
54, p. 12].  The US Commission on National Security/21st 
Century also acknowledges DoD headquarters are larger than 
advertised, because of billets and duties “hidden” within 
other agencies [Ref. 49, p. 14]. In general, DoD concurs 
with these claims; the Defense Reform Initiative contains 
decisions to solve most of these problems [Ref. 53, pp. 18, 
19]. 
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4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Method 
There are many advantages and disadvantages to each 
approach.  This makes it inherently difficult for the 
different agencies to agree on a “standard” approach to 
determining TTR.  The following is a list of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the three approaches:   
Cost of fighting forces versus support structures: an 
advantage of this approach is that PEs can be employed in 
both the Force Structure vs. Infrastructure and the Major 
Force Programs and Program Elements methods to determine 
TTR. This approach also has technical feasibility; the 
information can be monitored and measured easily by an IT 
system. However, in the first method the additional costs 
of defining and maintaining MFPs as well as categories of 
forces and infrastructure may become people intensive and 
hence cost prohibitive. Another disadvantage is that these 
approaches assume the PEs are homogenous, if this 
assumption is incorrect then some method has to be employed 
to breakdown the PEs into forces and infrastructure; this 
leaves the breakdown to the subjectivity of the specific 
agencies.  The biggest disadvantage in the second method is 
that there are many gray zones (some MFPs are comprised of 
both tail and tooth elements) in the classification of the 
MFPs.   
TTR relationship to combat and support personnel: this 
approach assumes that number of personnel is the cost 
driver for both tooth and tail.  This approach is easier 
and costs less to measure. However, this assumption might 
be too simplistic and leaves out other key aspects. Another 
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major disadvantage is the cost associated with defining and 
maintaining categories of force and infrastructure. 
Procurement Programs and Projects: with a good 
analysis tool (simulation) this approach can clearly 
identify cause and effect relationships and manage them in 
order to reduce costs.  There is already a pre-existing 
infrastructure within Program Offices (Program Managers) to 
measure these costs. However, this approach only takes into 
account the costs of existing programs, it does not take 
into account the general and administrative costs 
associated with the non-combatant commands.   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the main factors involved in 
calculating the TTR.  The Goldwater-Nichols Act established 
a demarcation line between forces and infrastructure.  The 
definitions of tooth and tail as assumed by DoD from this 
law are, TOOTH: military units assigned to combatant 
commands, and TAIL: administration and force support 
activities assigned by the Secretary of Defense to the 
military departments, the Defense Agencies, civilian 
contractors or in some especial cases combatant commands. 
Three different approaches to the definition of TTR 
were presented and the current TTR in DoD was calculated 
using the first two approaches, (the third approach will 
not provide a total TTR for DoD, and can only be calculated 
on a case by case basis for each acquisition program): 
1) Comparing the dollars that are allocated to the 
combat or fighting capability (tooth), and the dollars that 
are allocated to everything else (tail).  Within this 
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approach two methods to determine the TTR were examined:  
the Force Structure vs. Infrastructure method and the Major 
Force Programs and Appropriation Codes method; 
2) Comparing the relationship between the people 
involved in combat and the people involved in support 
activities; and 
3) A separate TTR for specific procurement programs or 
projects. 
Finally the advantages and disadvantages of each of 
the three methods were discussed. 
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III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE TTR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Military historians have recognized the importance of 
logistics and supply lines for centuries.  For example, 
regarding the command needs, T’ai Kung in his Six Secret 
Teachings (eleventh century B.C.) recommended the number of 
aides to dedicate to logistics: “Supply officers, four: 
responsible for calculating the requirements for food and 
water; preparing the food stocks and supplies and 
transporting the provisions along the route; and supplying 
the five grains so as to ensure that the army will not 
suffer any hardship or shortage [Ref. 38, pp. 60, 61].”  
Interestingly, T’ai Kung used many animal body parts to 
describe the jobs of the General’s assistants: ‘legs and 
arms’ (direct staff), ‘ears and eyes’ (intelligence), 
‘claws and teeth’ (moral and martial law officers), 
‘feathers and wings’ (image and propaganda); but apparently 
‘tail’ was never used.  
  Sun-Tzu’s Art of War (written approximately in the 
sixth century B.C. and generally considered the oldest and 
greatest known Chinese military work), also presents 
logistics and provisions as one of the basic elements for 
mobilization and for obtaining the advantages of military 
actions [Ref. 38, p. 159].  
Most military history books however, only present the 
strategic and tactical aspects of the battles and pay 
little or no attention to how the commanders logistically 
supported the forces involved in the struggle.  The lack of 
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logistics details makes it appear as if the commanders were 
able to move entire armies (forces and resources) 
effortlessly toward their objectives [Ref. 37, p. 1]. 
This chapter presents a historical perspective of how 
logistic needs have shaped the TTR of armies over the 
centuries.  It is virtually impossible to obtain reliable 
financial data from more than a few decades ago.  Due to 
this constraint, most of the analysis in this chapter 
regarding the TTR will use the “combat vs. support 
personnel” approach.  
Low technology, manpower intensive armies (such as 
ancient armies) can employ the personnel approach with a 
certain degree of confidence.  In early times, “support 
forces” always traveled with the army, for this reason some 
sections of this chapter will regard all support personnel 
as tail regardless of their geographical location (i.e. 
detached with the forces vs. operating from a fixed 
location).  
 This chapter is significant because knowledge of the 
past enhances the perception and ability to understand the 
present; this is especially true within the military.   
B. ANCIENT MILITARY TRENDS  
Throughout history there is abundant evidence that the 
development of mankind and warfare are inextricably tied 
together.  Ancient history records are largely dedicated to 
wars and conquests.  The literature presents many examples 
of the simultaneous development of utensils for hunting, 
household and weaponry; first using stone and later metal.    
As time progressed trends can be seen towards introducing 
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the military transport; increasing the ascendancy of the 
horseman; and upgrading manufacture “technology” for 
primitive weapons.  At that moment, in addition to the 
weapons and the mission, the capabilities for transporting 
and supporting the warriors began to dictate the 
composition and tactics of each army [Ref. 8, p. 1-3].   
Prior to 1000 B.C. armies were organized according to 
specific social structures. The nobles and members of the 
royal family rode in chariots. The cavalry was composed of 
lesser nobles and the infantry was made up of men from the 
poorest social classes. There was very little organization 
and no prearranged campaigns; battles were conducted 
similar to a modern day raid. [Ref. 8, p. 3, 4]  
The TTR of these armies was expectedly very low based 
on their tactics and socio-economic breakdown.  The nobles 
that comprised the cavalry sections were expected to supply 
themselves with horses, weapons, armor and other goods.  
The infantry soldiers were expected to obtain their 
supplies through loot and booty.  There was no need for 
care or supplies for prisoners because defeated armies were 
slaughtered.  Captured cities were destroyed and the people 
enslaved to support the armies’ needs [Ref. 8, p. 3, 4].  
With this type of socio-economic structure and concept of 
warfare, there was very little need for organic support 
personnel other than the nobles’ servants and possibly a 
staff for the general (normally the King). 
C. EARLY MILITARY SOCIETIES 
Around 700 B.C., war became the main business of many 
nations.  The need for increasing wealth was satisfied 
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mainly through the proceeds of armed combat.  Military and 
political organizations began to consolidate and blend.  
Regular armies were created and the states, including their 
financial and administrative systems, were built around 
those armies.  This military nature of the state extended 
well into the Roman Republic and even to the feudal era in 
the years 800 to 1000 A.D.  A combination of civil and 
military authority on the general’s staff facilitated the 
administration and the logistics support of the armies. 
[Ref. 2]  
There are no clear records to determine an exact TTR.  
However, information about the field armies of these 
ancient military organizations maintains that they may have 
occasionally approached 100,000 men and that these armies 
were accompanied by siege trains and specialized equipment 
[Ref. 8, pp. 4-18].  Although the looting, enslavement and 
killing of prisoners continued, the size of these forces 
indicates the existence of very organized supply systems. 
An example of the people possibly involved in support 
activities can be seen in Xerxes’ expedition to Greece in 
480 B.C.  According to Herodotus, the total number of 
persons that accompanied Xerxes on this campaign was more 
than five million.  In those years, the followers of an 
army would include bodyguards, older soldiers exempt from 
combat duty, hostages, servants, seers, physicians, 
sophists, poets, historians, tutors, secretaries, 
surveyors, transport guards, soothsayers, courtesans, 
musicians, engineers and a siege train [Ref. 11, p. 11].  
Considering that contemporary writers were known for 
exaggerating numbers, and even reducing Herodotus numbers 
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by two thirds, the total number of people involved in the 
campaign would still have been between 1.5 to 1.8 million 
(Davis in Ref. 6 is inclined to accept that even 2.5 
million people is not an outrageous number).  Other writers 
estimate Xerxes’ fighting forces from 150,000 to 180,000 
men. [Ref. 6, p. 14].  In this case, the TTR of Xerxes’ 
army was close to 9 to 1 (9 followers/supporters for every 
fighter).  
D. THE LOGISTICS OF THE MACEDONIAN ARMY 
The Macedonian Army between the years 350 to 320 B.C. 
was probably the best military force known to humanity up 
to that point and maybe even up to the 15th century when 
gunpowder weapons were introduced.  For the first time in 
history, scientific analysis was used to design tactics and 
battle movements.  Philip of Macedon developed the most 
thorough administrative and logistics system known and his 
son Alexander was the first to devise and use prototypes of 
field artillery that could be carried by mule or horse to 
the battle. [Ref. 8, pp. 50-53] 
 Alexander, like most of his contemporary generals, 
made extensive use of conquered districts’ resources.  
However, evidence suggests that on occasion he had to 
import food and water from great distances to support his 
men and animals.  In fact, the success of Alexander’s 
sustained military expeditions reflected in large part his 
careful logistics planning. [Ref. 11, pp. 2, 3] 
A study to reconstruct the Macedonian’s logistics 
system was conducted by Evans [Ref. 11].  The study 
calculated the consumption rates of food and water of the 
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army based on the nutritional requirements of men, horses, 
mules and camels, and on the number of troops, followers, 
cavalry, and baggage animals.  The study argues that the 
Macedonian army used one servant for every ten foot 
soldiers and one for every cavalryman to carry supplies or 
needed gear.  The infantry-cavalry ratio was about six to 
one which translates to an overall ratio of one servant for 
every four combatants.  During Alexander’s reign it was 
estimated that for every two combatants there was one 
follower [Ref. 11, pp. 10-25] 
Additionally, armed servants called ‘psiloi’ were 
usually used to guard the camp and baggage trains. The 
normal organization of the army called for approximately 
1000 ‘psilois’ per 7,000 combatants in a phalanx [Ref. 8, 
p. 51].  
The numbers above would reflect a TTR of 1 to 1.12 (1 
servant/follower for every 1.12 fighters).  These numbers 
differ greatly from other contemporary armies.  The main 
reason for this efficiency is that “both Philip and 
Alexander’s troops carried their arms, armor, utensils, and 
some provisions while marching and did not use servants or 
carts to carry these items…” [Ref. 11, p. 12]  
E. THE ROMAN LEGIONS 
The Roman military system was based on an essentially 
professional citizen army.  The Roman armies were 
successful because they introduced a new organization based 
upon age and experience rather than wealth or social 
condition.  Rome traditionally had two consular armies, 
each consisting of 18,000 to 20,000 men.  Each consular 
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army was formed by two Roman and two allied legions, but in 
times of war there might have been more than the 8 standard 
legions.  By 220 B.C. the total military manpower of Rome 
was calculated to be 750,000 men. [Ref. 8, pp. 79, 80] 
If the numbers above are credible they indicate that 
from the 750,000 men in the militia system, 40,000 
conformed the two consular armies and the rest had to be 
support personnel; a rough calculation will show a TTR of 
18 to 1.  If 220 B.C. included more than the 8 standard 
legions, the TTR would be slightly lower; however it would 
still be significant. 
Because military service was mandatory for males 
between 17 and 60 and men over 47 only served in the 
garrisons [Ref. 8, p. 79], a simplification can be made to 
assume that roughly 30% of the men served in the garrisons 
and no more than 500,000 men were able to serve in the 
consular armies.  If this simplification is accepted, then 
a new TTR of about 10 to 1 can be calculated for the field 
forces.  This rate is similar to the one calculated for 
Xerxes’ invasion army but a lot higher than the Macedonian 
army’s TTR.   
F. MILITARY SYSTEMS IN THE FEUDAL ERA AND MIDDLE AGES  
Charlemagne’s military system of calling men to 
service through his noble vassals is considered one of the 
predecessors for the development of the feudalism of the 
middle ages.  Feudalism was based on the military concept 
of local defense.  The king would confer lands to the 
lords, and in return they would pay the king by allowing 
him to use men from their district on military operations 
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for a given period each year.  This process allowed the 
kings to maintain standing armies throughout the year 
without excessive damage to the economy or without 
antagonizing friendly areas by the normal foraging and 
plundering of the armies of that period. [Ref. 8, pp. 225, 
226, 264, 265] 
Although no numbers are available to determine a TTR 
for the armies of this era, feudalism represents an 
intuitive cost-effective use of forces.  This concept in 
turn led to another economical scheme: nobles would raise 
mercenary forces and then hire them out to kings who didn’t 
have the funds to maintain full-time armies [Ref. 8, pp. 
301-356].  In this way, if each soldier had to provide his 
weapons, and buy his supplies and elementary necessities, 
the logistics requirements for the king were practically 
nil. 
In times of peace, these mercenary companies became a 
menace due to their illicit activities.  The French 
solution to this problem in the 15th century was to create a 
standing army which was based on the ‘lance.’  Each lance 
consisted of a gendarme, a squire, 2 archers, and 2 pages 
or valets who served as foragers, scouts and pickets and 
were not counted as combatants [Ref. 8, pp. 434-444].  This 
basic organization results in a TTR of 1 support person for 
every two fighters.  Of course, when these lances were 
grouped in companies or forces, the ratio must have 
increased.    
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G. TAIL TO TOOTH RATIO IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY  
During the early period of the American Revolutionary 
War, the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War of 1846, 
U.S. military logistics underwent many changes, from a 
completely decentralized concept to a centralized one that 
would be the first stone of today’s logistic system. [Ref. 
37, p. 5]   
In 1775, during the American Revolution, independent 
agencies like the Commissary General, the Quartermaster 
General, Army Engineers and a military medical department 
were introduced by the Congress.  At that time, the 
Congress also decided that the individual colonies should 
provide the necessary men and supplies for the army.  
Troops were required to provide their own weapons, 
ammunition, food and clothing.  The army lived off of the 
total exploitation of the regions through which it marched.  
A private contracting system was established to meet the 
army needs; however the acquired supplies sometimes could 
not be delivered because the transportation system (also 
private) was not adequate or there were no funds to pay for 
the transportation. [Ref. 37, pp. 5-22]  
Under these conditions, it can be assumed that the 
personnel TTR was very low for the army of the 
Revolutionary War.  
Prior to the Civil War in 1861, the conditions under 
which the army operated were not much different from those 
present at the end of the Revolutionary War.  The size of 
the standing army was close to 16,000 men and there was no 
logistics system to deal with the support requirements.  
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The states were still responsible for feeding, equipping 
and clothing the troops, with a subsequent reimbursement by 
the federal government.  On the other hand, the overall 
economic infrastructure was different; food supplies were 
plentiful, roads and railroads allowed the supplies to be 
easily moved to camp, and the industrial base had expanded 
significantly. [Ref. 37, pp. 32, 33]  
Combat operations frequently were subordinated to the 
supply and maintenance of the armies.  The practice of 
foraging was officially discouraged; however it was used 
extensively when armies became self-contained and without 
external supplies.  Often groups of businessmen would 
follow the armies selling a variety of goods directly to 
the soldier due to the inadequate size of the soldier 
ration. [Ref. 37, pp. 32-47]   
Consequently, the personnel TTR for the armies during 
the Civil War was small; however, the kind of “outsourcing” 
which produced this reduction in TTR, by exploiting the 
soldiers and the civilian population, was not one that 
modern armies are advised to follow. 
The characteristics of war changed radically during 
World War I and II.  The global scope of these two 
conflicts made them completely different from any war 
mankind had seen before.  In the case of the U.S., for the 
first time the whole nation was at war, and the economy was 
committed to the production of war goods.  Troops and 
equipment had to be transported by land, sea and air across 
huge distances.  Technology improvements and the appearance 
of more complex systems and weapons also created new 
logistical demands.  Concepts like systems maintenance and 
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weapons repair, both “in place” and “depot level,” were 
introduced.  Completely new organizations were needed to 
create, manage, administer and support the vast amount of 
forces the U.S. needed to get into combat. [Ref. 37, pp. 
59-124] 
All the above circumstances created an explosive 
increase in the number of organizations, agencies, staffs, 
and personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces between 1915 and 
1945.  This massive buildup of forces and the lack of a 
managerial system, like the PPBS, make it very difficult to 
calculate a TTR for the U.S. military during this period in 
history. 
With the introduction of the PPBS and the MFPs in 
1962, there is better information to determine a TTR.  
Figure 3-1 shows the changes of the DoD “tail” as a 
percentage of TOA since 1962 and projected through 2007 
[Ref. 40, Table 6-5].  As was mentioned in chapter II, some 
MFPs are considered either “tail” or “tooth.”  Figure 3-1 
also illustrates the two different approaches, Case A 
considers MFPs 1 through 5 and 11 as combat forces programs 
or “tooth,” while Case B considers that only programs 1, 2 
and 11 are really “tooth.”  Regardless of the approach 
employed, Figure 3-1 shows a large increase in the “tail” 
during the Vietnam era, and also a constant growth of the 
“tail” starting around 1986 and up to 2002.   The 
projection for FY 2003-2007 indicates a reduction of about 
4% in the “tail.” 
 
 
























































Figure 3-1, Size of the DoD “tail” Since the Introduction of the PPBS 
 
In relation to the personnel TTR of the U.S. forces, 
Figure 2-12, Chapter II, shows that this ratio was around 
55% to 59% over the past 5 years. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter illustrates how support and logistics 
activities have been an integral part of all military 
operations throughout history.  Military historians have 
recognized the significance of logistics for centuries and 
the great military commanders have been those who have best 
managed the logistics of their armies. 
 Using the “combat vs. support personnel” approach, a 
TTR was estimated for several periods of military history. 
These TTRs have varied from very low percentages in the 
ancient armies, to almost 95% in the Roman Legions, back 
down to approximately 55% in DoD in the past years, as 
shown in Figure 3-2.  
However, the armies that have been able to reach those 
low TTR levels accomplished them by using methods that go 
  49 
against modern rules of war, even to the point that they 






























































Figure 3-2, Evolution of the TTR Based on the “Combat vs. Support 
Personnel” approach 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
ADVANCES IN THE TTR  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III illustrated how the need for logistics and 
support activities in military operations has changed 
throughout the centuries; and how the TTR has fluctuated 
due to these changes.  History has shown that introducing 
and assimilating new military technologies and weapons can 
change the nature of warfare substantially.   
This chapter will show that technology is a key factor 
that has contributed to the changes in TTR.  The increasing 
dispersion of forces, reductions in the number of personnel 
on the front lines of combat, and new logistics 
organizations and agencies (“tail”) to provide for the ever 
increasing needs of the forces in combat are some of the 
features influenced by the changes in technology. 
In recent years, the U.S. has increasingly relied on 
stealth, standoff, hypersonic, long-range, and unmanned 
systems.  This chapter will focus on how these recent 
changes may affect the Operation and Support (O&S) costs 
and the subsequent breakout between “tail” and “tooth” on 
these future programs.  
B. REDUCTION IN THE TAIL AS A DIRECT EFFECT OF ADVANCES 
IN TECHNOLOGY 
Often times introducing a new weapon or technology 
leads to a direct reduction in “tail” and a corresponding 
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increase in “tooth,” as was the case with the introduction 
of the sail in naval warfare.   
In the 15th century, Mediterranean galleys 
traditionally had a total crew of 400, of which 
approximately 320 were oarsmen and the rest sailors and a 
small contingent of soldiers. Most galleys had 3 to 5 small 
cannons mounted in the bow [Ref. 8, p. 503].  In the early 
16th century the first sail vessel designed specifically for 
war was the Galleon.  The mid-sized Spanish version of the 
galleon carried approximately 14 officers, 23 seamen, 20 
apprentices, 14 pages, 22 gunners, an infantry company of 
at least 100 troops and 20 to 40 guns of varying calibers.  
[Ref. 34]   
During the transition from the age of the oar to the 
age of sail, the main objective in battle was boarding 
enemy ships. Based on this objective, only the infantry 
component and the sailors could be considered “tooth.”   
Consequently, during the age of the oar the “tooth” on the 
galleys was approximately 20% (80/400), and the 
introduction of the sail increased the “tooth” to close to 
82% (159/193) on the galleons (the apprentices are not 
counted as “tooth”).  
C. INCREASE IN THE “TAIL” AND/OR REDUCTIONS IN THE 
“TOOTH” AS A DIRECT EFFECT OF ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY 
In other historical examples, introducing a new weapon 
or technology either increased the “tail,” reduced the 
“tooth,” or in some cases both.   
For example, the invention of rapid-firing guns and 
machine guns produced a dramatic increase in the need for 
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ammunition. The Germans based their prediction of 
ammunition needs for WW I on the Austrian war, where they 
fired an average of 200 rounds per gun.  In 1914 at the 
start of the war they had 1000 rounds available per gun.  A 
month and a half into WW I the Germans realized that all 
their rounds were expended.  Due to the increased rate of 
fire, the weapons that normally lasted throughout the 
entire war now had to be repaired. This resulted in the 
need for and later creation of new logistics organizations 
and agencies (“tail”) to provide for the ever increasing 
needs of the forces in combat. [Ref. 37, p. 63] 
In time, the increase in effectiveness and lethality 
provided by these rapid firing guns created a substitution 
effect, i.e. less rifles/soldiers (“tooth”) were 
needed/desired in the combat front. In fact, throughout 
history the strategies and tactics to employ new weapons 
with significant increases in lethality have normally 
reduced the number of people exposed to the threat of the 
new weapon [Ref. 9, p. 337].  In other words, with every 
large increase in weapon lethality there has been a 
corresponding increase in dispersion or a reduction in 
number of personnel on the front lines of combat (i.e., 
reduction in the “tooth”).    
Dupuy [Ref. 9] studies the increase in the lethality 
of weapons throughout the ages.  He describes the 
relationship between the years in history, the ‘theoretical 
killing capacity per hour' of the weapons and the 
dispersion in square meters per man in combat.  Because the 
actual lethality of a weapon decreases as the dispersion of 
the troops in combat increases, the study combined these 
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two factors to develop an “Operational Lethality Index 
(OLI).”  Appendix B, Table B - 1 summarizes these concepts.  
The OLI shows the relative battlefield values of weapons in 
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Figure 4-1, Some Values of the Normalized Comparative Operational 
Lethality Indices 
In this thesis, the OLI is used to show how technology 
has reduced the number of soldiers on the combat front per 
unit of area needed to obtain a specific level of lethality 
or a required level of deterrence.  In order to obtain a 
more descriptive measure, this research developed 
“Normalized Comparative Operational Lethality Indices.”   
These indices are shown in Table B - 2 Appendix B and 
Figure 4-1.  The values were normalized by assigning the 
value of 1 to the OLI of hand-to-hand combat in 1975; the 
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graph shows the reduction in lethality of the weapons with 
the increasing dispersion of the troops in combat. 
For example, as Table B - 2 and Figure 4-1 show, with 
the normal dispersion factor of troops in 1975, replacing 
the lethality/deterrence of a one megaton nuclear airburst, 
would require about 30 million ancient/medieval soldiers 
fighting hand-to-hand, or about 140,000 soldiers with WW II 
machine guns, or about 600 WW II fighter bombers. 
In other words, introducing a new technology such as 
nuclear weapons reduced conventional resources from the 
front lines of combat, which could be casually interpreted 
as a reorientation of resources between “force” programs.  
However, the reality is that whenever manpower is replaced 
by technology, some of the funds that were paying for 
soldiers (“tooth”) will now be paying for centralized 
command and control activities, centralized support and 
maintenance, acquisition infrastructure, research and 
development, and other activities generally considered as 
“tail.” 
For example, the US Air Force today has 92% fewer 
airplanes and 91% fewer pilots than it did in World War II; 
in the 1950s, more than 40 percent of all Air Force 
officers were pilots; whereas today, pilots account for 
only 17% of the USAF officer force.  Regarding these facts, 
Maj. Gen. Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret) commented that "Some 
may see this as an adverse 'tooth-to-tail' ratio. It is 
important to point out that the Air Force's large 'tail' 
produces a numerically small but militarily large 'tooth.' 
This is good. Fewer young Americans are at risk, while we 
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leverage aerospace superiority to achieve policy goals." 
[Ref. 4]  
Reducing the “tooth” (force structure) should also 
bring a reduction in associated infrastructure activities, 
like central training, central personnel and central 
medical.  However, these three categories represent 
approximately 30% of the total infrastructure categories, 
versus 60% in categories such as acquisition 
infrastructure, central logistics, installation support, 
and command, control and communications that normally grow 
with the introduction of new weapons and technologies [Ref. 
50, p. 12].  Additionally, savings in infrastructure 
resulting from force structure reductions historically lag 
a few years behind the actual change [Ref. 51, p. 13].  
This phenomenon is not exclusive of DoD’s 
technological advances.  In the corporate world, companies 
frequently trade increases in fixed costs for lower 
variable costs whenever they invest in cost-saving 
technologies.  Some of the investments in technology may be 
associated with production lines (“tooth”), but in many 
cases they are associated with office and service 
automation (“tail”). [Ref. 16, p. 64] 
The bottom line in the corporate world then is not 
whether the investment in technology is being performed in 
the “tooth” or in the “tail” of the organization, but 
whether the investment will actually reduce the overall 
costs of production.  
The comment by MG. Link presented above highlights an 
interesting point; there is a difference between the 
“numerical tooth” and the “military tooth.”  In other 
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words, as is the case in the corporate world, it is not the 
size of the “tooth” and consequently the size of the “tail” 
that really matters; the important issue is how efficiently 
the one supports the other to boost the combat capabilities 
of the force. 
D. PRECISION-GUIDED ORDNANCE AND LONG-RANGE UNMANNED 
SYSTEMS  
The trend towards smaller but more lethal forces, 
distributed throughout a theater of operations, while 
maximizing the use of more lethal weapons is part of the US 
vision for future warfare [Ref. 39].  The goal of these new 
tactics and technologies is to reduce collateral effects 
and the risks faced by the combat forces. 
Some approaches being considered include: enhancing 
U.S. reliance on stealth, standoff, hypersonic, long-range, 
and unmanned systems; increasing the high-volume precision 
strike capabilities by fielding the Tactical Tomahawk 
missile and the Extended-Range Guided Munition; 
distributing forces throughout a theater of operations and 
developing new network-centric concepts of warfare; and 
developing ground forces that are lighter, more lethal, 
more versatile, more survivable, more sustainable, and 
rapidly deployable. [Ref. 39]  
Specifically regarding the unmanned systems and 
precision attack weapons and technologies: 
The 2003 budget increases the number of 
unmanned aircraft being procured and accelerates 
the development of new unmanned combat aerial 
vehicles capable of striking targets in denied 
areas without putting pilots at risk. The budget 
includes $1 billion to increase the development 
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and procurement of Global Hawk, Predator, and 
several new varieties of unmanned vehicles and to 
begin development of the Navy’s Unmanned 
Underwater Vehicle….  
…DoD is taking steps to shift the balance of 
its weapons inventory to emphasize precision 
weapons— weapons that are precise in time, space, 
and in their effects. New classes of hypersonic 
weapons will provide precision in time— arriving 
at their designated aimpoints when they are 
needed. GPS-guided munitions such as the Joint 
Direct Attack Munition will provide precision in 
space — striking targets with unparalleled 
accuracy in any weather condition, day or night. 
And new classes of kinetic and non-kinetic 
weapons will provide precise effects — minimizing 
collateral effects while maximizing their 
intended effects whether they be holding 
underground facilities at risk, defeating 
chemical or biological weapons, or rendering 
enemy command and control systems unreliable. 
[Ref. 39, pp. 79, 81] 
Some of these systems are already deployed, “…the 
victories in Afghanistan were won by ‘composite’ teams of 
U.S. Special Forces on the ground, working with Navy, Air 
Force and Marine pilots in the sky (using precision-guided 
bombs)….  Putting U.S. Special Forces on the ground early 
to assist with reconnaissance, communications and targeting 
dramatically increased the effectiveness of the air 
campaign….” [Ref. 39, p. 30] 
Two important characteristics of unmanned and 
precision attack systems, accuracy and reliability, are 
also two of the basic factors considered to calculate the 
theoretical lethality index of a weapon system [Ref. 10, 
pp. 19-23].  Based on that fact, it is logical to infer 
that unmanned systems and precision attack weapons have or 
will have a high OLI, and that, as in the past, the 
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assimilation of these new technologies will result in a 
larger reduction/dispersion of troops in the combat front 
(i.e. an apparent reduction in “tooth”).  
For example, DoD currently has 90 UAVs in the field, 
equivalent to 0.6 percent of the military aircraft fleet, 
i.e., there are 175 manned aircraft for every unmanned one 
in the inventory. By 2010, this inventory is programmed to 
grow to 290, with UAVs replacing manned airplanes in a 
wider variety of tasks because of their advantages in 
certain mission areas, commonly categorized as “dull, 
dirty, and dangerous” [Ref. 30, pp. i, ii].  
From the TOC point of view, comparisons between manned 
and unmanned systems have shown that the only differences 
are in the operations and support costs.  Historically 
development costs to reach first flight have been 
essentially the same.  Although experience shows that the 
production cost of an aircraft is directly proportional to 
its empty weight, the savings from deleting the cockpit, 
displays, and survival gear from the manned airplane must 
be applied to the “ground cockpit” of the UAV aircrew, 
which typically offsets any difference in acquisition 
costs. [Ref. 30, pp. 51-54] 
These are the main areas where UAVs may increase 
efficiencies and reduce O&S costs compared to manned 
aircraft [Ref. 30, pp. 54-55]:  
- UAV crews do not operate in the same unique 
environment as manned aircraft crews do, the same 
limits to flight duration, and recovery time between 
flights do not apply to UAV crews.  Due to that, the 
number of crews required to maintain a specific 
level of time airborne can be reduced. “At typical 
overseas detachments of intelligence, surveillance 
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and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft (U-2s, RC-135s), 
three to five crews fly four to five 6-12 hour 
sorties per week. If the same number of UAV crews 
were used, using 6 to 8 hour shifts, they should be 
capable of conducting 7x24 operations for the same 
period or longer, a significant increase in crew 
availability.” [Ref. 30, p. 42]  
- In the future, the paradigm of one crew, one 
aircraft should give way to a concept of one crew, 
multiple aircraft, further multiplying the 
availability and reducing the total number of crews 
needed.  
- If the aircrews are removed, the concept of aircrews 
practicing in their environment to maintain their 
flying proficiency and the need for continuation 
training sorties has to be revised. A large portion 
of the O&S cost for today’s manned aircraft are due 
to training. In fact, 95% (50% for ISR aircraft) of 
the time flown by manned aircraft is in peacetime 
training of aircrews.  UAV operators could receive 
the majority of their training in simulators, 
reducing the actual flight time for UAVs. 
Although the possibility of lower sortie rates should 
also lead to reductions in certain support personnel, with 
their associated training and support costs (“tail”), it is 
clear from the list above that most of the cost reductions 
derived from the UAV programs, when compared to manned 
aircraft programs, will be in the number of operating crews 
and the need for field training (“tooth”).   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the influence that introducing 
and assimilating new military technologies and weapons has 
had on force structure.  In some cases, the new technology 
produced a reduction in the tail.  However, when a weapon 
with a large increase in lethality is introduced, there is 
a corresponding increase in dispersion or a reduction in 
some force program (i.e. reduction in the “tooth”); and an 
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increase in other activities generally considered as 
“tail.”  
The “Comparative Operational Lethality Index” 
discussed in this chapter was used to show how the number 
of soldiers on the combat front per unit of area, needed to 
obtain a specific level of lethality or deterrence, has 
been reduced by the development of new technology. 
The important issue regarding technological advances 
must be how efficiently the “tail” supports the “tooth” to 
boost the combat capabilities of the force and not whether 
the investment should be classified as “tail” or “tooth.” 
The corporate world uses a similar concept for its 
investments in technology.  The focus is on the reduction 
of the overall costs of production; not on the area of the 
organization in which the investments are made.  
Specifically, in the case of the US vision for future 
warfare; where unmanned vehicles are one of the approaches 
being considered, this chapter showed that although these 
programs will certainly produce a reduction in some 
activities considered “tail,” most of the cost reductions 
will be in categories normally regarded as “tooth.”  Even 
with this expected decrease in the “tooth,” DoD’s overall 
capability to control and exploit the air will increase 
significantly. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TTR AND 
OPERATIONAL READINESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze how the design of 
maintenance and repair levels may impact the total life-
cycle cost (LCC) of a program, and the breakdown of that 
LCC into its different areas. 
Typically, the LCC of a system is separated into four 
areas:  research and development (R&D), investment, 
operating and support (O&S), and disposal.  As this chapter 
will show, when the percentage of the program’s funds 
invested in each of these areas varies, the TTR of the 
individual program - and consequently that of the DoD (on a 
macro level) - varies accordingly.  
Additionally, this chapter studies the relationship 
between the operational readiness of a weapon system - 
defined here as its operational availability - and the TTR 
of a specific program. 
B. IMPACT OF MAINTENANCE LEVEL DESIGN ON THE TTR 
The percentage of the LCC attributable to R&D, 
investment, O&S, and disposal varies depending on the type 
of system. However, for major defense weapon systems the 
percentage breakdown of the LCC has been relatively 
constant throughout the years, as shown in Figure 5-1. 
[Ref. 31, Ch. II] 







Figure 5-1, Historical Life-Cycle Cost Breakdown of a Weapon System 























Figure 5-2, Costs Normally Considered Infrastructure Grouped by 
Appropriation Category (Fiscal Years 1996-2001)  
This chapter is centered on the O&S costs of a system.  
This focus was chosen based on the information revealed in 
Figure 5-1, in which O&S costs have historically 
represented 60% of the total life-cycle costs of a weapon 
system.  A secondary rationale for this focus is based on 
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the fact that the two appropriations that support the 
largest share of O&S costs - operations and maintenance 
(O&M) and military personnel – represent, according to some 
studies, 80% of the costs normally considered as 
infrastructure (see Figure 5-2 above). [Ref. 52, p. 10 and 
Table 2] 
During the O&S phase of an acquisition program, three 
levels of maintenance and repair processes can be 
established [Ref. 7, pp. 12-14]: 
- Organizational level maintenance:  Lower level of 
maintenance, normally preventive actions performed 
by an operating unit on a day-to-day basis in 
support of its own operations.   
- Intermediate level maintenance:  Includes corrective 
maintenance of varied complexity, can be either part 
of the unit level organization or external to the 
unit and responsible for providing support to 
several units within an installation or geographical 
area.   
- Depot level maintenance:  Includes the costs of 
performing major overhauls or maintenance at 
centralized repair depots, contractor repair 
facilities or on site by depot maintenance teams.  
 
According to the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the DoD 
definitions of mission/force categories and infrastructure 
categories presented in Chapter II, organizational and 
intermediate level maintenance must be considered “tooth” 
and depot level maintenance (Central Logistics) should be 
considered “tail.”  Many studies and reports postulate, 
without in-depth analysis, that the reallocation of 
resources from the “tail” to the “tooth” always leads to an 
increase in efficiency.  Following this line of thought, 
organizational and intermediate levels of maintenance can 
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be considered more cost-effective than depot level 
maintenance. 
Such oversimplification is not always correct.  For 
example, the Army selected the RAH-66 Comanche program to 
test innovative approaches to reduce O&S costs [Ref. 55].  
In order to obtain these cost reductions, the Comanche was 
the first Army helicopter ever to be designed for a two 
level maintenance and repair process:  organizational and 
depot level maintenance.  Studies have shown [Ref. 7] that 
completely eliminating intermediate level maintenance, and 
improving reliability and maintainability of the 
helicopter, can indeed reduce O&S costs substantially.   
According to the DoD's Selected Acquisition Report 
dated December 11, 2000 and the Congressional Budget 
Office, the total program costs of the RAH-66 Comanche 
helicopter are $48.1 FY2000 billions.  Once adjusted for 
inflation (using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator 
inflation index), the total O&S costs for the program are 
approximately $15.26 FY2000 billions according to Dellert 
[Ref. 7], and $17.2 FY2000 billions according to the 
Program Management Office (PMO).  
These two calculations indicate that the O&S costs 
will represent between 31.7% and 35.8% of the total RAH-66 
Comanche program costs.  These percentages are much lower 
than the historical 60% of the O&S phase for major defense 
weapons systems.  Although it is not specified by Dellert 
[Ref. 7], it is safe to assume that most of the 
intermediate maintenance functions will move to Depot Level 
instead of Operational Level.  Two facts support this 
assumption: first, by definition only low level maintenance 
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actions are performed at the operational level, increasing 
this capability implies a large investment in 
infrastructure, test equipment, etc; secondly, modern 
aircraft are highly modular, which implies that operational 
level maintenance is normally restricted to changing 
spares, while higher levels of maintenance manage the 
repair processes.  Contrary to the concept of always 
eliminating the “tail,” this example shows that an increase 
in the “tail” can reduce total LCC. 
It is important to draw attention to the fact that the 
total O&S cost estimates for the Comanche program provided 
by Dellert [Ref. 7] and the PMO are initial estimates.  
Most aircraft, as they age, experience higher O&S costs and 
lower operational availability (Ao) than those originally 
projected during the procurement phase.  Currently planned 
useable life for the Comanche is 20 years; however, almost 
all DoD platforms have been around longer than originally 
anticipated and it is unlikely that the Army will dispose 
of the system in the designated timeframe.  Additionally, 
the Comanche was designed with ambitious reliability and 
maintainability goals; any deviations from those goals or 
any increase in the projected flying hours of the platform 
will raise O&S costs. [Ref. 7, Ch. IV]    
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATIONAL READINESS AND THE TTR 
The readiness or Ao of a weapon system is defined as 
the probability that a system or equipment, when used under 
stated conditions in an actual operational environment, 
will operate satisfactorily when called upon (i.e. at a 
random time). This value provides the percentage of weapons 
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systems in mission capable status, or the percentage of 
time that a system is in mission capable status in the long 
run. [Ref. 18, p. 10] 
The readiness or operational availability (Ao) can be 
expressed as: 
uptime MTBMAo
uptime downtime MTBM MDT
= =+ +  
MTBM is the mean time between maintenance; and MDT is 
the maintenance downtime, the total elapsed time required 
to repair and restore a system to full operating status 
(i.e. the turn-around time(TAT)). [Ref. 18, p. 9, 10]  
Using the definition of Ao, the number of mission 
capable systems (MCS) is: 
MCS Ao Total Nr of Systems= ×   
In other words, given a required number of MCS for any 
weapon system, the total number of systems that must be 
acquired can be decreased by improving weapon system 
readiness (i.e. increasing MTBM and/or decreasing MDT).  
Increasing MTBM implies improving the reliability or 
quality of the systems, while decreasing MDT means reducing 
repair time and administrative/logistics delay times [Ref. 
17, p. 28].   
The above paragraph indicates two different approaches 
to obtaining a required MCS.  The first is to produce a 
large inventory of weapon systems, i.e. to increase the 
“tooth;” Kang has called this approach the concept of 
“readiness at any cost” [Ref. 17, p. 27].  The other 
approach involves committing more resources to areas like 
R&D, increasing depot level maintenance capacities, or 
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improving logistics information/administrative systems, 
which are normally considered “tail.”    
According to Kang [Ref. 19], the Standard Depot Level 
Maintenance (SDLM) for the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet must 
be done every 4 years and the desired SDLM TAT is 6 months, 
which defines an expected Ao (disregarding downtime for 
Operational and Intermediate Level maintenance) of: 
4 0.889
4 0.5
Expected Ao = =+  
If the Navy has a total of 774 F/A-18 aircraft, then 
the expected number of mission capable aircraft (MCAe) is: 
774 0.889 688eMCA = × =   
However, for a number of reasons the current SDLM TAT 
is 12 months, i.e. the current Ao is: 
4 0.8
4 1
Current Ao = =+  
And at this level of Ao, the Navy will need 860 





= = =  
Under the concept of “readiness at any cost,” to 
maintain the same level of readiness the inventory 
(“tooth”) must be increased by 86 aircraft.  Alternatively 
the same effect can be obtained by investing in the depot 
level maintenance capabilities (“tail”) needed to reduce 
the SDLM time to 6 months.  A complementary approach would 
be to reduce the administrative/logistics delay time.  
As indicated above, there is a direct relationship 
between the spare parts inventory (aircraft in this case) 
and the readiness of the aviation fleet.  An increase in 
the number of airplanes (an increase of budget in the 
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‘tooth’) should normally lead to an increase in readiness.  
However, such is not always the case. [Ref. 20] 
Kang, et all. [Ref. 21] utilize a model to calculate 
Ao for an aircraft squadron that operates 20 single-engine 
aircraft and maintains its own repair facility.  The model 
assumes that engine failures follow an exponential 
distribution at a rate of one per aircraft per 100 hours 
(i.e. failure rate/AC = 0.01), and the time to repair is 
exponentially distributed with a mean of 5 hours (i.e. 
service rate = 0.2). Every time an engine fails, it is 
removed from the aircraft and a spare engine is installed, 
if available. The faulty engine is sent for repair. If a 
spare is not available when an engine fails, the aircraft 
is grounded until a spare engine is repaired and delivered. 
The model was used to compare two different scenarios; the 
results are shown in Figure 5-3. 
The first scenario demonstrates that an increase in 
the spare parts inventory may provide a higher Ao.  
However, the law of diminishing marginal utility or returns 
applies, and the marginal increase in Ao decreases as the 
number of spares is increased.  In the example analyzed by 
Kang, et all. [Ref. 21], with 0 spares the average Ao = 
0.841. With one spare, Ao = 0.863, an increase of 0.022; 
while going from nine to ten spares increases Ao only by 
0.004. 
For the Scenario 2, the average repair time increases 
from 5 hours to 10 hours (i.e. the repair rate is now only 
0.1 AC/per hour) but the maximum failure rate (when all the 
aircraft are in operational mode) remains the same at 0.2 
AC/per hour (0.01 x 20 aircraft).  This means that in the 
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long run, 50% of the aircraft will be inoperable, 
regardless of the number of spares (“tooth”) in the system.   
Figure 5-3 confirms that in scenario 2 Ao will remain 
constant even with additional spare parts available.  Kang 
















Figure 5-3, Operational Availability for Different Repair Times and 
Sparing Levels  
[From Ref. 21] 
As this example shows, increases in the ‘tooth’ do not 
always lead to increases in operational readiness.  There 
should always be a balance or trade-off between investing 
in equipment (sparing levels or “tooth”) and investing in 
logistics or administrative capabilities (“tail”).   
DoD’s expansive weapons inventory is aimed at 
maintaining the highest possible level of military 
readiness.  This, however, is in direct contrast to the 
corporate world where high levels of inventory are seen as 
an unnecessary and expensive liability.  Although in both 
the defense and commercial sectors, high inventory levels 
may improve “readiness” by making sure goods are always 
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available. This is a costly approach which is subject to 
obsolescence and pilferage. [Ref. 17, p. 7] 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter studied how the design of the maintenance 
and repair processes of an acquisition program can 
influence the total LCC of the system.  The examples given 
demonstrated that the organizational and intermediate level 
maintenance are not always more cost-effective than depot 
level maintenance.  Contrary to the widely accepted belief 
that the key to efficiency lies in eliminating the “tail,” 
increases in the “tail” often lead to reductions in total 
LCC. 
Many of the studies that call for reducing the TTR, 
state that DoD must reduce the operating, support, and 
infrastructure costs.  The ultimate objective is that any 
savings realized through this process be applied to the 
“tooth,” to sustain adequate levels of readiness.  However, 
increasing the inventory (“tooth”) is only one possible way 
to improve readiness, sometimes increasing the depot level 
maintenance and/or the administrative/logistics 
capabilities (“tail”) may be better alternatives.   
The economic theory, supported by empirical evidence, 
of diminishing marginal utility or returns is as applicable 
in this case as in any other economic aspect. As the amount 
of “tooth” is increased, holding all other inputs constant, 
the amount that readiness increases for each additional 
unit of “tooth” will generally decrease.  Thus, in every 
case a cost-effectiveness analysis should be used to 
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determine the best method to reduce costs while also 
improving readiness. 
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VI. TAIL TO TOOTH RATIO WITHIN THE CORPORATE WORLD  
A. INTRODUCTION 
For the past two decades, DoD has started several 
initiatives to search for "best business" practices in the 
corporate world and implement them into its operations.  
These practices are aimed at streamlining management 
oversight, eliminating redundant functions, and outsourcing 
or privatizing activities to the greatest extent possible.  
Jack Welch took a similar approach with General Electric 
(GE) when he directed the company to sell or close any 
business unit in which they were not number 1 or number 2 
in that market niche [Ref. 3]; this directive forced GE to 
take a serious look at which businesses were really adding 
value to the company.   
The corporate world’s financial aim is to create 
shareholder value.  In DoD, a purely non-profit 
organization with many and varied missions, there is no way 
to determine the bottom line from an accounting 
perspective.  The efficiency objective in DoD, however, is 
similar to that in the corporate world: change its 
processes so that it can become a leaner, more flexible and 
more efficient organization.   
One metric DoD evaluates to determine the success of 
such initiatives is the TTR.  In Chapter II, several 
examples were given of how DoD defines and calculates TTR.  
This chapter offers an alternate point of view by exploring 
how this measure is defined, calculated and employed within 
the corporate world. 
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B. TAIL TO TOOTH DEFINITION IN THE CORPORATE WORLD 
Within the corporate world, as is the case within DoD, 
there are several ways to define what is “tooth” and what 
is “tail.”  Three of these interpretations will be 
discussed within this chapter: the overhead versus the 
direct cost approach; the selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) cost versus cost of goods sold; and 
finally the primary versus support activity approach.  All 
of these approaches are focused on the corporate world’s 
bottom line:  creating shareholder value and return on 
capital. [Ref. 44]   
1. Overhead Versus Direct Cost 
Two basic costs in financial terms are overhead and 
direct cost.  Overhead costs are defined as “any costs not 
directly associated with the production or sale of 
identifiable goods and services; sometimes called ‘burden’ 
or ‘indirect costs’.” [Ref. 42, Glossary]  Overhead defined 
in this manner can be considered similar to the military’s 
definition of “tail.”  Direct costs are defined as “cost of 
direct materials and direct labor incurred in producing a 
product.” [Ref. 42, Glossary]  Direct materials are “those 
materials that become an integral part of a company’s 
finished product and that can be conveniently traced to 
it,” whereas direct labor is “reserved for those labor 
costs that can be directly traced to the creation of 
products in a ‘hands on’ sense and that can be so traced 
without undue cost or inconvenience.” [Ref. 12, p. 26]  In 
this context, direct cost is the “tooth” of the corporate 
world.  
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There has been a lot of controversy amongst 
accountants regarding direct costing.   
The controversy is over the theoretical 
justification for excluding fixed overhead costs 
from the cost of units produced and therefore 
from inventory.  Advocates of direct costing 
argue… that the costs for facilities, equipment, 
insurance, supervisory salaries, and the like, 
represent costs of being ready to produce and 
therefore will be incurred regardless of whether 
any actual production takes place during the 
year.  Advocates of absorption costing argue 
…that fixed costs such as depreciation and 
insurance are just as essential to the production 
process as are the variable costs, and therefore 
cannot be ignored in costing units of products 
[Ref. 12, p. 267] 
It is clear from the above paragraph that the 
corporate world, like DoD, also has problems specifying 
what items are truly “tail” and “tooth.”  
One method of accounting that can be used with this 
approach is Absorption Costing (Full-costing). Absorption 
costing is a product-costing method that assigns all 
manufacturing costs to a product: direct materials, direct 
labor, and overhead [Ref. 15, Glossary].  This method 
allows all manufacturing costs to be fully assigned to the 
product.   
2. Selling, General and Administrative Cost (SG&A) 
Versus Cost of Goods Sold 
Paul Strassmann, former Director of Defense 
Information, has been watching the corporate tail-to-tooth 
ratio for 20 years and defines it as the ratio of SG&A cost 
to the cost of goods sold. [Ref. 43]   
SG&A is defined as expenses that are not specifically 
identifiable with, or assigned to, production. [Ref. 42, 
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Glossary] Selling costs are the costs necessary to market, 
distribute, and service a product or service.  Examples of 
selling costs include: salaries and commissions of sales 
personnel, advertising, warehousing, shipping and customer 
service. Administrative costs are the costs associated with 
research, development, and general administration of the 
organization that cannot reasonably be assigned to 
marketing or production [Ref. 15, Ch. IV]  
Cost of goods sold is the inventoriable costs that 
firms expense because they have sold the units. [Ref. 42, 
Glossary]  The cost of goods sold can also be defined as 
the cost of direct materials, direct labor, and overhead 
attached to the units sold [Ref. 15, Glossary].     
Strassmann believes that this approach is a good 
measure of how much overhead (transaction cost) is needed 
to support the delivery of a dollar’s worth of goods and 
services [Ref. 43].  This definition would be analogous to 
a common definition of TTR within DoD – how many support 
personnel are needed to support the functions of one combat 
personnel.  An appropriate accounting method that can be 
used to categorize this approach is Activity Based Costing 
(ABC). 
a) Activity Based Costing (ABC) 
The ABC method uses direct and driver tracing to 
assign costs to activities and then traces costs from 
activities to products.  [Ref. 15, Glossary]  This method 
is very different than the one taken by traditional cost 
accounting methods. 
Traditional cost accounting methods suffer 
from several defects that can result in distorted 
costs for decision-making purposes. All 
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manufacturing costs - even those that are not 
caused by any specific product - are allocated to 
products. And non-manufacturing costs that are 
caused by products are not assigned to products. 
Traditional methods also allocate the costs of 
idle capacity to products. In effect, products 
are charged for resources that they don't use. 
And finally, traditional methods tend to place 
too much reliance on unit-level allocation base 
such as direct labor and machine-hours. This 
results in overcosting high-volume products and 
undercosting low-volume products and can lead to 
mistakes when making decisions. [Ref. 13] 
 
The ABC method assumes that cost objects generate 
activities that in turn consume costly resources. 
Activities form the link between costs and cost objects. 
Activity - based costing is also concerned with overhead -
both manufacturing overhead and SG&A overhead. The 
accounting for direct labor and direct material is usually 
unaffected. 
ABC should be viewed as a management process 
which examines how an entity’s activities consume resources 
and relate to its outputs. ABC can be used to break down an 
organization’s processes into activities, and measure each 
activity’s cost and performance effectiveness. This is 
accomplished by assigning costs to the related activities 
based on use of resources, and then by assigning costs to 
cost objects, such as products or customers, based on use 
of activities. Those costs that cannot be directly traced 
to activities or outputs are assigned to outputs based on a 
cause and effect relationship or through cost assignment. 
Many private sector and several federal sector 
entities that have implemented ABC have chosen to designate 
activities as either value added or non-value added 
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activities. Value added activities are those activities 
that cannot be excluded without negatively affecting output 
quality; non-value added activities can be excluded without 
affecting output quality. Resource costs are assigned to 
activities. Next, activity costs are assigned to outputs. 
The costs that cannot be specifically traced to activities 
or outputs are then allocated to outputs. 
This method helps corporations institute 
performance measures and gauge actual performance against 
these measures; it also requires a cross-functional look at 
resource consumption. [Ref. 45]  
3. Primary Versus Supporting Activities 
Another approach to defining TTR in the corporate 
world is the primary versus support activity approach.  
This approach is derived from the value chain concept.  The 
premise of this approach is that all activities add value 
to the organization, but in order “to understand the firm's 
source of comparative advantage it is necessary to analyze 
internal activities that contribute to value creation.” 
[Ref. 47] 
 
Figure 6-1, Porter Value Chain Model Primary vs. Support Activities  
[From Ref. 47] 
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Primary activities are those that create, deliver and 
service the product; while support activities are those 
that allow the primary activities to be performed (similar 
to indirect cost centers). [Ref. 47]  The chart above 
illustrates how primary and support activities are related 
according to Porter’s value chain model. 
Primary activities are: 
Inbound logistics – acquiring inputs that are used in 
the product, such as warehousing, materials handling, and 
inventory control. 
Operations – transforming inputs into the final 
product through such activities as machining, assembly, 
molding, testing, and printing. 
Outbound logistics – activities related to storing and 
physically distributing the final product to customers, 
such as finished goods warehousing, order processing, and 
transportation. 
Marketing and Sales – processes through which 
customers can purchase the product and through which they 
are induced to do so, such as advertising, distribution of 
catalogs, direct sales, promotions, and pricing. 
Service – services to enhance or maintain product 
value, such as repairing, supplying parts, or installation. 
Support activities which are placed above the primary 
activities in Figure 6-1 are: 
Procurement – refers to the processes and activities 
involved in purchasing inputs and not to the inputs 
themselves, or to the way the inputs are handled once they 
are delivered. 
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Technology development – refers to the product and 
process development processes and to the organizational 
learning processes, which result in improved products and 
services and in improvements in the way organizational 
functions are performed. 
Human resource management – includes human-based 
activities such as recruiting, hiring, training, 
performance evaluation, employee development, and 
compensation. 
Firm infrastructure (Administration) – consists of 
general management activities such as planning and 
accounting. [Ref. 16, pp. 46-49] 
Once all activities are categorized, they are examined 
as to costs and contributions to the firm's strategy.  One 
way to examine these costs is through value chain analysis. 
a) Value Chain Analysis 
During the past 15 years, most U.S. corporations 
transitioned from large conglomerates to highly focused and 
specialized market-specific operations.  During this 
period, these corporations identified their core 
competencies and reorganized to best capture the market 
niche that they hoped to fill.  Often, if other competitors 
were better in an area than they were, they either 
restructured or got out of that market niche.  The message 
during those years was:  “Do what you do best and outsource 
the rest.” [Ref. 2] 
Industry analysis is key to understanding how a 
firm fits and maneuvers within its environment. This 
analysis should indicate what costs, products, prices, and 
market choice strategies are key to gaining a competitive 
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advantage. However, to understand the firm's source of 
comparative advantage; it is necessary to analyze internal 
activities that contribute to value creation. [Ref. 47] 
A value chain analysis is useful to assess how a 
firm creates an advantage.  The value chain is the linkage 
across the activities of the firm.  Each activity is viewed 
as creating, enhancing, or complementing value (profit) 
creation.  The value chain provides the firm with a 
comprehensive framework to systematically search for ways 
to provide superior value to the customers.  Every firm is 
a collection of activities that are performed to design, 
produce, market, deliver, and support its products. The 
division of the value chain into primary and support 
activities can help a firm understand existing and 
potential advantages and also low value or redundant 
activities or processes.  
Throughout the corporate world, each firm has 
different activities and/or emphasizes different 
activities, which in turn provides unique ways in which 
profits are earned. [Ref. 47]  In the retail industry, for 
example, Wal-Mart emphasizes the primary activities of 
logistics and operations to achieve low costs through 
economies of scale; Nordstrom emphasizes marketing, sales, 
and service to differentiate its higher quality, but higher 
price strategy. [Ref. 47]  
If DoD could be thought of as a corporation with 
many different business units, it too would face the same 
issue as the corporate world; each business unit would have 
a different emphasis towards achieving the corporation’s 
strategic goals (which in DoD is intangible). 
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C. SUMMARY 
Table 6-1 summarizes the different interpretations of 
“tooth” and “tail” in the corporate world.  The aspects 
that are common between the three definitions are presented 
in bold characters.  Figure 6-2 presents the same 
information graphically. 
Table 6-1, Commonalities in the Definitions of “Tail” and “Tooth” in 
















Tail - Overhead  
- R&D and G&A not 
assigned to marketing 
or production 





- R&D and G&A not 





- Human resource 
management 
- Firm infrastructure 
(Administration) 
Tooth - Direct Labor 
- Direct Materials 
- Marketing 




service assigned to a 
product 
- Direct Labor 
- Direct Materials 
- Marketing 
- Overhead 
- Inbound logistics 
- Operations 
- Outbound logistics 
- Marketing and Sales 
- Service 
As the corporate world continually tries to reinvent 
itself, it has gone through several process reengineering 
efforts; to include – absorption costing, activity based 
costing, and value chain analysis.  Because of the focus on 
the bottom line (profits) within the corporate world, it is 
easier to decipher what is “tooth” and what is “tail” in 
the corporate world than in DoD.  However, even with this 
steady focus on profitability, disagreements still arise 
amongst business leaders regarding how this “tooth” and 
“tail” should be measured.   
DoD, which is composed of many different functionally 
oriented business units, has no tangible or easily 
quantifiable bottom line on which to focus.  Due to the 
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intangible nature of the organizational objectives, it has 
become increasingly more difficult to define the boundaries 
between “tooth” and “tail.”  With the continued emphasis 
placed on “best business” practices, it is important to 
note that not all “best practices” are directly 
transferable from the corporate world to DoD.   
 
Figure 6-2, Commonalities in the Definitions of “Tail” and “Tooth” in 
the Corporate World 
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VII. A NEW APPROACH TO THE “TAIL-TO-TOOTH” RATIO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the boundary between “tail” and 
“tooth” through specific DoD cases and examples.   These 
cases introduce variations on the specific situation, the 
environment and the timing of the measurement of the TTR; 
with the intention of investigating if such changes have 
any effect on the definitions of “tail” and “tooth,” and 
consequently on the resultant value of the TTR.  
A new approach for determining the TTR is investigated 
and used in a qualitative example to determine what may be 
considered “tail” or “tooth” in the US Special Operations 
Forces Command. 
This section of the research culminates with the 
redefinition of the concept of TTR and the postulation of a 
new approach to define “tooth” and “tail.” 
B. CURRENT DOD TTR DEFINITIONS UNDER FLUCTUATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
Chapter II introduced the different approaches used in 
DoD to define “tooth” and “tail,” and presented the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with each method.  
The “actual” TTR of DoD was calculated using the different 
approaches and each approach produced substantially 
different results.  The main reason for these differences 
is that all of the methods attempt to establish an 
unambiguous boundary between “tail” and “tooth.”  This 
section will demonstrate that a clear limit does not exist.  
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On the contrary, the definitions of “tail” and “tooth” 
change with the specific situation, the environment and the 
timing of the measurement. 
1. The Situationally Dependent Boundary Between 
“Tail” and “Tooth”  
In Chapter VI, the cost component “Direct Labor” for 
the corporate world was defined as those costs that can be 
directly traced to the labor that creates the final 
product, i.e. labor costs that can be directly traced to 
the “tooth.”  
In DoD the costs of labor are defined by the pay 
appropriations that make up each fiscal year’s budget.  The 
following categories comprise the pay appropriations for 
Active Military personnel [Ref. 33, Table 6-3B]: 
− Basic Pay 
− Retired pay accrual 
− Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH)  
− Subsistence allowance 
− Incentive pays 
− Special pays 
− Other allowances 
− Separation pays 
− Federal Income Contribution Act 
− Permanent change of Station travel 
− Cadets 
− Miscellaneous 
In the corporate world “direct labor” is an integral 
part of the costs of goods sold (COGS); in other words it 
is an essential component of the core business of a 
company.  Following that concept, when any of the above 
cost categories is appropriated to pay for active military 
personnel laboring in an activity considered as “tooth,” 
then that cost must be considered as part of the core 
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business of DoD, i.e. the cost category becomes “tooth.”  
On the contrary, if the appropriations are paying for 
active military personnel working in activities considered 
“tail,” then those same categories becomes “tail.” 
This is not the case in DoD’s current definitions of 
“tooth” and “tail.”  For example, the infrastructure 
category ‘Central Personnel Benefits Programs’ includes all 
family housing programs, regardless of the job the Armed 
Forces member receiving the benefit performs.  However, 
housing costs are an integral part of the labor costs of 
active military personnel; therefore, housing costs of 
military personnel working in the “tooth” should be 
considered direct labor costs or “tooth” and indirect costs 
or “tail” for personnel working in the “tail.” 
To make this example more transparent, assume that all 
military family housing programs are privatized (of course 
this is not a viable alternative in many locations); and 
that instead of having a DoD organization in charge of 
providing housing benefits, every DoD military member is 
paid a housing allowance to rent from the market.  In this 
case housing costs will indisputably be a direct component 
of labor costs, i.e. for every active member there is an 
associated housing allowance cost, and that cost exists if 
and only if that member remains on active duty.   
The same notion should apply in the case of a DoD 
managed (or outsourced) housing programs.  The only reason 
for such programs is to provide a service that is an 
essential part of the labor costs of active military 
personnel.  For those members that opt not to live in 
military housing and currently receive a monthly housing 
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allowance as part of their salary, it is possible to 
allocate the costs of housing between tail and tooth.  To 
be consistent, the costs of military family housing 
programs should also be allocated between “tooth” and 
“tail” according to the type of job and physical location 
of the Armed Forces member that receives the benefit.       
An advantage of this approach is that it creates more 
visibility of the housing benefits costs, and it will 
clarify what portion of those benefits is directed towards 
personnel in the ”tooth” versus personnel in the “tail.”   
As part of its efforts to reduce infrastructure, DoD 
is conducting several programs to find competitive sourcing 
of services in the marketplace; military family housing is 
one of those programs.  Another advantage of allocating 
current housing program costs between “tooth” and “tail” is 
that when the transfer of military family housing to the 
private sector, as the preferred provider, is completed, it 
will be possible to determine the real budget appropriation 
that will be moved from the “tail” to the “tooth.”  
This approach can also be used for all costs that can 
be traced directly to labor costs, i.e. when direct and 
indirect labor are the clear cost drivers.  Applying this 
method should provide a TTR that portrays more closely 
those costs that cannot be reduced without damaging the 
effectiveness of the front line units.  Although some of 
these costs may be called “tail,” all costs directly tied 
to the personal wellbeing of a combatant have a direct 
relationship on the combatant’s level of effectiveness. 
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Unfortunately, the problem of deciding which personnel 
resides in the “tooth” or the “tail” still remains 
unresolved. 
2. The Environmentally Dependent Boundary Between 
“Tail” and “Tooth”  
DoD is composed of a large number of administrative 
commands, defense agencies, offices and activities, that 
provide goods and services to a large variety of 
‘customers.’  Those customers include combatant commands, 
other agencies in DoD, government agencies external to DoD, 
other countries and even civilian society.  Who is the 
customer (i.e., what is the real output or service being 
provided) and not where that service is coming from, should 
be the criteria to decide if a service is “tooth” or 
“tail.”   This concept is illustrated with the spatial 
Navigation and Force Tracking systems, which is heavily 
reliant on the Global Positioning System (GPS).    
In 2001 the Commission to Assess United States 
National Security Space Management and Organization 
affirmed: 
The security and economic well being of the 
United States and its allies and friends depend 
on the nation’s ability to operate successfully 
in space… Specifically, the U.S. must have the 
capability to use space as an integral part of 
its ability to manage crises, deter conflicts 
and, if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict. 
[Ref. 39, p. 93] 
Additionally, DoD considers that all efforts to 
improve capabilities in Space, Information and Intelligence 
(SII) contribute directly to meeting all six of the DoD’s 
operational goals established at the QDR and enhance the 
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flexibility of the Armed Forces and their capacity to meet 
a wider range of contingencies. [Ref. 39, p. 93] 
The following are the key areas of the military space 
capabilities [Ref. 39, p. 94]:  
− Space launch, range operations, and terrestrial 
control networks; 
− Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); 
− Satellite communications (SATCOM); 
− Launch detection and tracking; 
− Navigation and force tracking; 
− Meteorology and other environmental support to 
military operations; and 
− Space surveillance and control. 
 
Navigation and Force Tracking systems provide 
worldwide precision position, navigation, and timing to 
both military and civilian users through the GPS satellite 
constellation.  Future generations of GPS satellites will 
add a second civil frequency for all users. [Ref. 39, p. 
96] This definition of navigation and force tracking 
systems reveals that the GPS is designed for and used in 
two different kinds of environments, i.e. two different 
categories of customers: civilian and military. 
There are multiple military applications of the GPS, 
ranging from purely administrative, to logistics, 
operational navigation, and lately guidance of weapons.  
Current generations of standoff weapons employ GPS to guide 
themselves to geo-spatial coordinates loaded into the 
weapon prior to launch.  In this manner, the GPS is acting 
similar to a Fire Control System for a fire and forget 
weapon.  Each day GPS is becoming more and more essential 
for navigating and positioning air, surface, subsurface and 
ground units.  GPS has also been used to improve logistics 
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systems; forces are currently increasing their use of GPS 
in real-time inventory placement and tracking. 
It would be hard to argue that providing GPS 
information for civilian activities is part of the core 
business of DoD.  But, as mentioned above, there are many 
military applications that are clearly part of the core 
business of DoD, and therefore must be considered “tooth.”  
However, until 2002 the GPS was explicitly included in the 
Command, Control and Communication infrastructure (“tail”) 
category.  DoD’s new infrastructure categories (see Table 
2-2), do not explicitly include the GPS within the 
Communications and Information Infrastructure category; 
however, it is also not included in any of the Force 
Structure categories (Table 2-1).  Additionally, Chapter II 
- Section b) showed that some sources consider MFP 3, 
Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence and Space as 
infrastructure or “tail.” 
One problem that arises when trying to classify GPS 
costs is that, contrary to housing or medical services, 
there is not a clear activity driver for these costs.  
Although there may be some functions that are specific to 
civilian or military use, in general the system works as a 
whole, which makes it very difficult to allocate GPS costs 
between DoD and non-DoD users.  Even if an allocation were 
to be made for DoD, a further allocation is needed to 
separate services that are clearly combat related or 
“tooth” and services that are administrative support or 
“tail.”   
DoD’s missions and objectives are growing both in 
number and in variety, especially in the field of 
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operations other than war (OOTW) and constabulary 
operations.  Consequently, the fraction of DoD’s SII 
capabilities that contributes directly to the Department’s 
core competencies is also increasing.  These facts suggest 
that a large percentage of SII costs, including GPS, should 
be considered “tooth.”  
However, some sources disagree with this concept and 
give more importance to the location from which the service 
is being provided: 
In our analysis of DOD’s infrastructure and 
mission programs, we found that many 
intelligence, space, and command, control, and 
communications programs are excluded from the 
infrastructure, even though they appear to fit 
DOD’s infrastructure definition. …These programs 
include installations, facilities, and activities 
that would not deploy with combat forces but 
would support those forces. …Although combat 
forces may link into these systems, the actual 
systems operate from fixed locations. We believe 
that by categorizing most intelligence, space, 
and command, control, and communications programs 
as mission activities, even though they appear to 
include infrastructure activities, DOD’s 
accounting of infrastructure may not be complete. 
[Ref. 52, pp. 4, 5]  
3. Time-Based Boundary Between “Tail” and “Tooth”  
The categorization of activities as “tail” and “tooth” 
can also vary with time, especially between peacetime and 
wartime.  Functions that can be clearly considered as non-
core or “tail” at a time when there is no/little conflict 
developing, may be considered core or “tooth” activities 
during wartime or when the characteristics of the conflict 
change. 
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Over the last 15 to 20 years, private organizations 
have increasingly outsourced their non-core activities to 
generate efficiencies and savings.  In recent years, DoD 
has gradually turned to the private sector to provide 
competitive sourcing of support services and functions that 
are considered commercial in nature.   These activities may 
have been previously provided by government employees, or 
were simply new services that required skills not 
immediately available in the Department’s military or 
civilian work force [Ref. 1, p. 14, 15].   
DoD is establishing two types of agreements with the 
corporate world, outsourcing and privatization.  
Privatization means reducing government ownership and 
suspending any type of DoD competition with private 
industry.  Outsourcing represents an intermediate step 
toward privatizing portions of DoD’s infrastructure, it 
combines government ownership with private contracting for 
various functions.  [Ref. 49, p. 24] 
The basic notion is that DoD and the Services must 
separate from non-core activities, and should outsource or 
privatize support functions clearly appropriate to the 
private sector, i.e. if its “tail” it should be outsourced 
or privatized.  The question then is what functions or non-
core activities are appropriate for the private sector? 
According to LG Thomas G. McInerney, USAF (Ret.), Former 
President and CEO, BENS: 
BENS believes that, like American business 
in the 1980s and the US defense industry in the 
1990s, DoD should focus on "core competencies" 
and outsource activities not critical to its 
mission. For the Pentagon, the core mission is to 
deter threats to US national security, and, if 
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deterrence fails, apply military force to win on 
the battlefield. Activities that are not combat 
capable should be classified as non-core and 
should be considered for outsourcing or 
privatization - if such services can be provided 
more efficiently and effectively by the private 
sector. [Ref. 26]  
Some sources consider that the privatization or 
outsourcing efforts should have an even larger scope: 
Any person or function that is not fully 
used in a necessary, core role in the Department 
is a “misallocation” that slows down the Pentagon 
and retards transformation. Every General, who 
pretends to be a “businessman” within some 
Defense Agency that the Department could 
privatize, detracts from combat capabilities. 
[Ref. 49. 18, 19] 
These types of statements raise additional questions 
such as: Do only combat capable activities work to deter 
threats to US national security?  What types of threats are 
being considered?  Is the spectrum of threats fixed?  What 
will be the battlefields of the future?   
Currently, DoD needs to plan for the possibility of a 
major conflict, but must also: provide security for 
homeland defense; respond to small-scale conflicts and 
international terrorism; carry out peacekeeping, 
humanitarian relief and constabulary operations; combat 
illegal drug trafficking; and protect and secure access to 
US interests (overseas and in space). 
With this broad range of missions, which include large 
scale and low intensity conflicts, OOTW, and operations 
without a clear enemy, it is very difficult to define an 
unambiguous limit between core and non-core, or combat 
capable and non-combat capable activities.  This boundary 
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changes depending on whether or not there is an on-going 
conflict, the type of mission to be accomplished, the 
composition/definition of the enemy and the scope and 
intensity of the conflict.  This increased operational 
tempo and missions has blurred the line between military 
and civilians performing combat activities.  Lately, 
civilians from private companies have replaced active 
soldiers in everything from logistical support to 
battlefield training and military advice at home and 
abroad. [Ref. 57]  
During this time of continued peace and low intensity 
conflicts, DoD has successfully used the private sector to 
provide services and products in various areas.  
Contractors have provided maintenance and base services 
support since the late 1960s, the Defense Logistics Agency 
employs direct vendor delivery to reduce warehousing and 
second destination charges, Federal Express provides the 
Air Force with 24-hour delivery of priority parts anywhere 
in the world, private contractors provide about 30 percent 
of DoD's depot-level maintenance and overhaul work. [Ref. 
26] 
Current doctrine plans for most of these contracts and 
activities to be executed during a time of increased 
conflict.  However, as mentioned above, the scope of 
participation of civilians in combat support activities has 
increased.  For example: 
During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, one 
[out] of every 50 people on the battlefield was 
an American civilian under contract; by the time 
of the peacekeeping effort in Bosnia in 1996, the 
figure was one in 10….contractors who perform 
tasks as mundane as maintaining barracks for 
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overseas troops, as sophisticated as operating 
weapon systems or as secretive as intelligence-
gathering in Africa. Many function near, or even 
at, the front lines [Ref. 57].    
Does the fact that these activities are being 
performed by civilian contractors automatically make them 
“tail” or non-core activities? If that is the case, can the 
same activities be outsourced in any kind of conflict? Will 
these private companies continue to be committed once the 
conflict increases and their lives are at a stake?  Will 
air, ground or maritime transport companies continue to 
risk their assets to deliver parts or personnel once they 
are declared military targets? Will insurance companies 
provide medical services if the conflict escalates and 
their monetary risk grows accordingly?  Will private 
companies maintain the surge capabilities needed for 
wartime operations? 
These questions may not currently have a clear answer. 
But, what is clear is that some activities considered non-
core or “tail” in one instance and under a certain type of 
conflict must definitely be reassessed as core or “tooth” 
activities when the timing or the characteristics of the 
conflict change.   
C. TTR BASED ON AN OUTPUT/OUTCOMES MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
Most private companies measure outputs and calculate 
whether the value derived from an investment is worth the 
expenditure.  Lately, there is a clear trend in both public 
and private organizations toward focusing on timely and 
meaningful outputs and outcomes (or impacts) of their 
investments over just inputs and processes.  
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Today, organizations’ monitoring and reporting 
structures cover aspects like financial performance, 
physical productivity, quality of service, and 
effectiveness of operations through the following [Ref. 
40]: 
- Inputs: how many resources are allocated to 
programs, in what amounts and at what times. 
- Outputs: the results achieved in relation to the 
resources spent (financial and non-financial, 
partial and comprehensive). 
- Outcomes: the expected result, the ultimate reason 
for the program (qualitative and quantitative). 
Up to this point, all the methods analyzed in this 
research use two basic criteria to determine whether a cost 
becomes part of DoD’s “tooth” or “tail:” the position 
inside the organizational structure, or the geographical 
location of the unit, agency or activity that causes the 
cost.  Based on the definitions above, these two criteria 
correspond to the inputs of the system. 
A new approach for determining TTR would be to design 
a new budgeting system based on outputs and outcomes, i.e. 
on the results obtained from the investment; instead of on 
an input-collected and functional system with information 
relevant only to where the money was invested.  The focus 
on outputs/outcomes of this system will be aligned with the 
Government Performance and Review Act (GPRA) of 1993, “The 
focus of GPRA is to be on outcomes vice inputs….  This 
shift in focus is expected to yield more results-oriented 
approaches and instill confidence in the government.” [Ref. 
27, p. 53]  In the corporate world, this new approach would 
be similar to value chain analysis with a subsequent 
breakdown of primary versus support activities.  To 
implement this new approach it is necessary to define a set 
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of outputs, outcomes or core products, related to specific 
capabilities closely related to DoD’s core competencies.   
The foundations of this approach can be found in a 
Defense Science Board study: 
Today, the Department’s PPBS process and 
fiscal functions are at best a poorly structured 
ledger entry and journal-oriented accounting 
system. It knows the cost of countless 
disconnected and unrelated pieces (program 
elements) but not the value of the various 
purposes of the enterprise. This state of affairs 
results from the Department’s focus on “inputs” 
versus “outputs….” For example, the Department 
can point to any number of program element codes 
associated with tactical systems, but it cannot 
evaluate the price of tactical operations—it does 
not think that way, nor does it set up and 
aggregate program accounts in that fashion. Nor 
does the Department possess the means to measure 
progress toward achieving any objectives. The 
current Defense Planning Guidance does not 
specify objectives or priorities, nor do the 
current Major Force Program categories in the 
PPBS process lend themselves to analysis by 
useful mission area. With no missions or 
objectives specified, the Department cannot 
measure meaningful ‘outputs.’  
Several years ago, a Defense Science Board 
(DSB) study suggested that the Department set up 
an ‘input-output’ style resource table. Such a 
table would have the various DoD (military 
Service) organizations arrayed along the 
ordinate, and the various output organizations 
(CINCs) along the abscissa, with the right 
vertical column totaling to the overall DoD 
budget at the bottom…. [Ref. 49, p. 39] 
In this case, the DSB assimilated outputs to Combatant 
Commands.  However that is not the only possible approach, 
the outputs can be related to any level of stakeholders, as 
long as they are related to DoD’s core competencies.  As a 
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qualitative example, the following section employs an 
outputs/outcomes based measurement system to determine a 
TTR of the Special Operations Forces. 
1. TTR of the Special Operations Forces (SOFs) Based 
on an Output and Outcomes Measurement System 
Special Operations use small units in direct and 
indirect military actions, with combinations of specialized 
personnel, equipment, training, and tactics that go beyond 
the routine capabilities of conventional military forces.  
The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was created 
in 1987 to prepare and maintain combat-ready SOFs to 
successfully conduct all types of special operations [Ref. 
56, p. 1].  USSOCOM, one of nine unified commands in the 
U.S. military’s combatant command structure, is commanded 
by a four-star flag or general officer with the title of 
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USCOMSOC). 
[Ref. 56, p. 45] 
SOFs were selected to apply an outputs/outcomes based 
measurement system because USCOMSOC has two roles: in his 
function as a supporting Commander, he carries out many 
service-like responsibilities, including training, ensuring 
combat readiness, monitoring personnel promotions and 
assignments, and developing and acquiring SOFs-peculiar 
equipment; in his job as a supported Commander, he must 
command selected special operations missions when directed 
by the National Command Authority (NCA). [Ref. 56, p. 11] 
The management of MFP-11 is also the responsibility of 
USSOCOM.  As such, USCOMSOC is the sole unified commander 
with responsibility for planning, programming, and 
  102 
budgeting military forces.  In essence, he is the only 
Combatant Commander with a checkbook. [Ref. 56, p. 11] 
a) SOFs Missions, Collateral Activities and 
Organization  
The first step to create an output/outcome based 
system for determining what may be considered “tail” or 
“tooth,” is to ascertain the purpose or missions of the 
SOFs and USSOCOM.   
Currently, SOFs have nine principal mission 
areas; they are also frequently tasked to participate in 
collateral activities that shift in response to the 
changing international environment.  Although these tasks 
are not principal SOFs missions, they must be considered in 
a TTR analysis. The SOFs’ principal missions and collateral 
activities are listed in Table 7-1, and are further 
described in Appendix C. [Ref. 56, p. 4] 
Table 7-1, SOFs’ Principal Mission Areas and Collateral Activities 
[After Ref. 56, p. 4] 
Principal Missions Collateral Activities 
Counterproliferation (CP) Coalition support  
Combating terrorism (CBT) Combat search and rescue (CSAR)  
Foreign internal defense (FID) Counterdrug (CD) activities  
Special reconnaissance (SR) Humanitarian demining (HD) 
activities  
Direct action (DA) Humanitarian assistance (HA)  
Psychological operations (PSYOP) Security assistance (SA)  
Civil affairs (CA) Special activities  
Unconventional warfare (UW)  
Information operations (IO)  
USSOCOM’s mission is to support the geographic 
Combatant Commands, ambassadors and their country teams, 
and other government agencies by preparing SOFs to 
successfully conduct special operations, including Civil 
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Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP). [Ref. 
56, p. 11]  
 
Figure 7-1 presents the USSOCOM organization.  A 
detailed description of this organization, the basic 
functions, and force structure of each command or 
component, can be found in the year 2000 Posture Statement 
of the United States Special Operations Forces [Ref. 56].  
The information is repeated in the Appendix C of this 




Figure 7-1, USSOCOM Organization 
[After Ref. 56, p. 46] 
 
b) Defining the TTR of the SOFs According to 
Primary and Support Activities 
Figure 7-2 classifies and describes the 
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competence, core products, and end products of the SOFs.  
The classification is based on Prahalad and Hamel [Ref. 
35], and on the structure, principal missions and 
collateral activities of the SOFs described in the previous 
section.   
 
 
Figure 7-2, Core Competencies and Products of the SOFs 
 
From Chapter VI, the SOFs’ primary activities are 
those that directly create, deliver and service the core 
products shown in Figure 7-2, while the activities that 
allow those primary activities to be performed are the 
support activities.   Table 7-2 gives an example of what 
occurs when the SOFs TTR is defined using primary and 
support activities according to the definitions outlined in 
Chapter VI, Section B.3. 
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Table 7-2, Example of Defining the SOFs TTR Using Primary and Support 
Activities 
Primary vs. support activities 
on outputs/outcomes system 
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Primary vs. support activities 















Plans and conduct: 













Plans and conduct 




The main advantage of this approach resides in 
its inherent focus on core competencies and core products, 
which could provide a more realistic approximation of TTR.  
It may also facilitate evaluating the true costs of 
operations, of executing the various DoD tasks, and of 
achieving specific DoD objectives. [Ref. 49, p. 39]  
The main disadvantage, as with all the other 
methods previously discussed, is that this approach tries 
to establish a well-defined boundary between “tail” and 
“tooth.”  It is unrealistic to define such a line.  For 
example, Table 7-2 looks at the SOFs organization as an 
autonomous entity; by changing the level of the analysis to 
a more macro or micro level, the definitions of primary and 
support activities also change. 
Additionally, it would be necessary to take into 
account the costs associated with the unavoidable change to 
DoD’s budgeting system.  If the only objective of that 
change is to find a better definition of the TTR, it would 
  107 
not be a justifiable investment from a cost-benefit 
perspective. 
D. “TAIL” AND “TOOTH” AS A CONTINUUM 
Chapters II and III of this research showed that, 
historically, the relationship between “tail” and “tooth” 
has been presented as a ratio or a percentage which implies 
determining two specific numbers for “tail” and “tooth.”   
DoD’s mandate by the US Code to report annually the 
appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces has 
intensified the fixation on defining a clear-cut line 
between combat and support. 
This research has shown that such a line is illusory.  
The boundary between “tail” and “tooth” behaves more as a 
wide, fuzzy, irregular band that fluctuates depending on 
the situation, the environment, and the timing.  
Consequently, the relationship between “tooth” and “tail” 
can no longer be considered a ratio or a mathematical 
relationship between two numbers, but more of a continuum.   
In DoD, activities that can be considered “tail” in 
most circumstances (such as procurement of office supplies 
or janitorial services) are located at one end of this 
continuum.  The other end of the continuum includes those 
activities that are unmistakably “tooth” (for example, an 
infantry soldier on the combat front, or a pilot and his 
aircraft on a combat mission).  As for the rest of DoD 
commands, activities and processes, it is really a futile 
exercise to position them in a specific place on this 
continuum.  Only when given a specific mission, time, and 
circumstances, will it be possible to position the varied 
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DoD activities onto this continuum.  Figure 7-3 graphically 
depicts this new concept.   
 
Figure 7-3, From a Fixed-Boundary to a Continuum Concept 
 
The notion of a one-dimensional continuum can be 
expanded to two dimensions.  For example, the location of 
an activity on the “Tail to Tooth Continuum” (TTC) at a 
given moment can be approximated by the activity’s 
correlation with the core product, and the current threat 
in a specified conflict.  The larger the correlation 
between the activity and the core product, and the higher 
the threat or conflict level, the closer that activity will 
be to the “tooth” on the two dimensional TTC. 
In the case of the SOFs, a Deployable Print Production 
Center (DPPC) for creating, editing, and producing PSYOP 
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print products in forward-deployed locations may be close 
to the “tail” if the core product is combating terrorism, 
but it will certainly be closer to the “tooth” quadrant, if 
the main mission is in psychological operations.  Figure 
7-4 illustrates this example. 
 
Figure 7-4, Example of Locating a SOFs Unit on a Two Dimensional “Tail 
to Tooth Continuum” 
Extrapolating the same argument for moving from one to 
two dimensions, argues that a three dimensional continuum 
could provide a better understanding of how to locate a 
specific activity between “tooth” and “tail.” 
Figure 7-5 shows how the third dimension could be used 
to validate the core product’s relevance to the desired end 
result in a specified circumstance; the higher the 
activity’s relevance the closer it will be to the “tooth” 
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quadrant.  An interesting conundrum arises when one 
activity simultaneously supports different core products.  
For example, SOFs combating terrorism and conducting 
psychological operations would be located in separate 
layers of the three dimensional TTC; but in a specified 
operation the same DPPC can support both core products 
simultaneously - this further illustrates the impossibility 
of defining a clear limit between “tail” and “tooth.” 
 
Figure 7-5, Three Dimensional “Tail to Tooth Continuum” 
 
This approach does not imply that DoD, nor any other 
organization, should neglect developing its core 
competencies.  The advantage of this approach is that it 
avoids the fruitless labeling of costs, allowing management 
to concentrate on increasing efficiency and reducing the 
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total costs of attaining DoD’s desired outcomes.  It may 
also help to avoid situations as described by Woodward: 
‘We haven’t done a very precise job of 
describing … the differences between tooth and 
tail,’ Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during a Pentagon 
round-table briefing Nov. 12. Myers was referring 
to the departmental jargon that distinguishes 
military commanders and combat forces — the tooth 
— from DoD overhead and support personnel — the 
tail. 
‘There’s a lot of what we call tail that we 
can’t go to war without,’ Myers continued. This 
was not taken into account ‘when we implemented 
the cuts.’ 
Congress in its 2000 Defense Authorization 
Act ordered DoD to trim 15 percent of its 
headquarters staffs by the end of 2002. The last 
‘7.5 percent [reduction] was supposed to happen 
this year,’ Myers said. He added that ‘we’re 
working very hard here in Washington and with our 
combatant commands to see if adjustments are 
justified.’ 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld echoed 
Myers’ concerns by noting that ‘we do not want to 
reduce [staff] levels to the point that we damage 
our effectiveness from a military standpoint.’ 
Nevertheless, he emphasized that DoD would 
continue its efforts to move ‘military people out 
of nonmilitary tasks’ that can be better 
performed ‘by civilians and contractors.’ [Ref. 
58] 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The concept of an unambiguous boundary between “tail” 
and “tooth” was investigated in this chapter.  Specific 
examples were used to demonstrate that a clear-cut line 
does not exist.  On the contrary, the definitions of “tail” 
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and “tooth” change with the specific situation, the 
environment and the timing of the measurement. 
The possibility of a new approach based on a new 
budgeting system, centered on outputs and outcomes instead 
of inputs, was presented.  This method was used in a 
qualitative example to calculate the TTR of the Special 
Operations Forces.  While this approach identifies several 
advantages, such as its inherent focus on core competencies 
and core products, and the feasibility of evaluating the 
true costs of operations, it is not without weaknesses.  
Its main weakness is that it is based on establishing a 
definite boundary between “tail” and “tooth” similar to the 
other methods. 
A more appropriate measure was theorized based on the 
fact that the relationship between “tooth” and “tail” can 
no longer be considered a ratio or a mathematical 
relationship between two numbers, but a continuum.  In this 
continuum, activities considered “tail” in most 
circumstances (e.g. procurement of office supplies or 
janitorial services) are located on one end, and activities 
unmistakably considered “tooth” (e.g. an infantry soldier 
on the combat front, or a pilot and his aircraft on a 
combat mission) are located on the other end.  The other 
DoD commands, activities and processes can only be 
approximated on this continuum according to specific 
missions, times and circumstances.  This one dimensional 
“Tail to Tooth Continuum” was further expanded to two and 
then three dimensions, according to the activity’s level of 
correlation with the core product, the current level of 
threat in a specified type of conflict, and finally the 
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relevance of the core product to the desired end result in 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This research determined the key factors involved in 
calculating the Tail to Tooth Ratio (TTR), and analyzed the 
influence that the current top management intent on 
decreasing the TTR has had on the United States Department 
of Defense (DoD) operational readiness and expenditure 
efficiency.  This was accomplished by analyzing documents 
and publications from DoD, Congress, and diverse 
organizations; examining concepts, testimonies, speeches, 
statements, and interviews released by top DoD management 
and Service leaders; and using specific DoD activities and 
programs as examples to demonstrate several theories and 
findings. 
This chapter summarizes the research findings, answers 
the research questions and presents some areas for further 
research. 
B. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The TTR expresses the relationship between the 
resources or forces employed to perform the core missions 
and the resources or infrastructure used to manage and 
support those forces.  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
establishes a demarcation line between forces and 
infrastructure.  The definitions of tooth and tail as 
assumed by DoD from this law are, TOOTH: military units 
assigned to combatant commands, and TAIL: administration 
and force support activities assigned by the Secretary of 
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Defense to the military departments, the Defense Agencies, 
civilian contractors or in some special cases combatant 
commands. 
There are three different approaches to the definition 
of TTR: 
1) Comparing the dollars that are allocated to the 
combat or fighting capability (tooth), and the dollars that 
are allocated to everything else (tail).  This approach, in 
turn, uses two methods to determine the TTR:  the Force 
Structure vs. Infrastructure method and the Major Force 
Programs and Appropriation Codes method; 
2) Comparing the relationship between the people 
involved in combat and the people involved in support 
activities; and 
3) A separate TTR for specific procurement programs or 
projects. 
Due to the corporate world’s focus on profits, it is 
easier to decipher what is “tooth” and what is “tail” 
within this environment than in DoD.  However, even with 
this steady focus on profitability, disagreements still 
arise amongst business leaders regarding how “tooth” and 
“tail” should be measured.  Several methods are used, 
including absorption costing, variable costing, activity 
based costing and value chain analysis.  Due to the 
intangible nature of DoD’s bottom line, it has become 
increasingly difficult to define the boundaries between 
“tooth” and “tail.”   
All of the methods used in DoD to measure the TTR 
attempt to establish an unambiguous boundary between “tail” 
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and “tooth.”  Specific cases and examples confirm that such 
a clear-cut limit does not exist.  On the contrary, the 
definitions of “tail” and “tooth” change with the specific 
situation, the environment and the timing of the 
measurement. 
A new approach based on a new budgeting system, 
centered on outputs and outcomes instead of inputs, has 
several advantages, including: its inherent focus on core 
competencies and core products, and the feasibility of 
evaluating the true costs of operations.  However, it is 
not without weaknesses; its main weakness is that it is 
based on establishing a definite boundary between “tail” 
and “tooth,” similar to the other methods. 
Because the demarcation between “tail” and “tooth” is 
not fixed, their relationship should not be expressed as a 
ratio or a mathematical relationship between two numbers, 
but as a continuum.  This “Tail to Tooth Continuum” was 
expanded to two and three dimensions, according to the 
activity’s correlation with the core product, the current 
threat level in a specified type of conflict, and finally 
the relevance of the core product to the desired end result 
in an explicit circumstance. 
This approach does not imply that DoD, nor any other 
organization, should neglect its core competencies.  The 
advantage of this approach is that it avoids the fruitless 
labeling of costs, allowing DoD management to concentrate 
on increasing efficiency and reducing the total costs of 
attaining DoD’s desired outcomes. 
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C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary research question: is the TTR an appropriate 
measure of operational readiness and military expenditure 
efficiency?  
The first attribute that a performance measure should 
have is objectivity.  A measure is objective if it can be 
independently measured and verified.  There should be 
little ambiguity about its meaning and the desired results. 
[Ref. 41, p. 235]  This research has shown that such a line 
is illusory.  The boundary between “tail” and “tooth” 
behaves more as a wide, fuzzy, irregular band that 
fluctuates depending on the situation, the environment, and 
the timing, making the TTR a completely subjective measure. 
Performance goals serve to communicate strategy and to 
motivate people; they compel the workforce to perform in a 
desired way; as such, they must be aligned with the 
organizations objectives and goals.  The demarcation line 
between forces and infrastructure established by the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act and the current DoD interpretations 
of TTR can produce incentives to eliminate costs understood 
as “tail,” sometimes without the necessary cost-benefit 
studies to determine what is the most efficient approach. 
Secondary research question number 1: what elements 
should be considered “tail” or “tooth” in determining the 
TTR? 
The relationship between “tooth” and “tail” should not 
be considered as a ratio or a mathematical relationship 
between two numbers, but rather as a continuum.  Activities 
that can be considered “tail” in most circumstances (such 
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as procurement of office supplies or janitorial services) 
are located at one end of this continuum.  On the other end 
of the continuum will be those activities that are 
unmistakably considered “tooth” (for example, an infantry 
soldier on the combat front, or a pilot and his aircraft on 
a combat mission).  Only with a specific mission, time, and 
circumstances, is it possible to approximate the position 
of the varied DoD activities onto this continuum.   
This one dimensional “Tail to Tooth Continuum” was 
further expanded to two and then three dimensions, 
according to the activity’s level of correlation with the 
core product, the current level of threat in a specified 
type of conflict, and finally the relevance of the core 
product to the desired end result in an explicit 
circumstance. 
Secondary research question number 2: what factors 
have influenced the change of the TTR over the past 
centuries?  
The “combat vs. support personnel” approach shows that 
the TTR has varied during several periods of military 
history from very low percentages in the ancient armies, to 
almost 95% in the Roman Legions, back down to approximately 
55% in DoD within the past five years.  However, the armies 
that have been able to reach those low TTR levels 
accomplished them by using methods that go against modern 
rules of war, even to the point that they threatened the 
very population that they were defending and protecting. 
In several cases, careful logistics planning or the 
introduction of new technology was responsible for reducing 
the TTR.  However, technology improvements and the 
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appearance of more complex systems and weapons created new 
logistical demands, and promoted the introduction of new 
organizations to create, manage, administer and support the 
vast forces needed for combat.  All of these circumstances 
created an explosive increase in the number of 
organizations, agencies, staffs, and personnel in the U.S. 
Armed Forces between 1915 and 1945. 
Secondary research question number 3: what is the 
effect of current technological advances on the TTR? 
History has shown that introducing and assimilating 
new military technologies and weapons, in some cases, 
reduced activities conventionally regarded as “tail.”  
However, when a weapon with a large increase in lethality 
is introduced, there is a corresponding increase in 
dispersion or a reduction in some force program (i.e. 
reduction in the “tooth”); and an increase in other 
activities generally considered as “tail.”  The important 
issue regarding technological advances must be how 
efficiently the “tail” supports the “tooth” to boost the 
combat capabilities of the force and not whether the 
investment should be classified as “tail” or “tooth.”  
In general, technology has reduced the number of 
soldiers on the combat front per unit of area needed to 
obtain a specific level of lethality or a required level of 
deterrence.  Specifically, in the case of the US vision for 
future warfare, where unmanned vehicles are one of the 
approaches being considered, these programs will certainly 
reduce some activities considered “tail;” but most of the 
cost reductions will be in categories normally regarded as 
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“tooth,” especially in flying crews and operational 
training costs.   
Secondary research question number 4: is there a 
direct relationship between operational readiness and TTR? 
Many studies call for reducing the “tail” with the 
ultimate objective of applying the realized savings to the 
“tooth” to sustain adequate levels of readiness.  However, 
in the case of the operational readiness of a weapon system 
- defined in this research as its operational availability 
- increasing the inventory (“tooth”) is only one possible 
way to improve readiness, sometimes increasing the depot 
level maintenance and/or the administrative/logistics 
capabilities (“tail”) may be better alternatives.   
The economic theory of diminishing marginal utility or 
returns is applicable in this case.  As the amount of 
“tooth” is increased, holding all other inputs constant, 
the amount that readiness increases for each additional 
unit of “tooth” will generally decrease.  Thus, in every 
case a cost-benefit analysis should be used to determine 
the best method to reduce costs while also improving 
readiness.  
The design of the maintenance and repair processes of 
an acquisition program can influence the total LCC of the 
system.  Organizational and intermediate level maintenance 
are not always more cost-effective than depot level 
maintenance.  Contrary to the widely accepted belief that 
the key to efficiency lies in eliminating the “tail,” 
increases in the “tail” often lead to reductions in total 
LCC.  
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Secondary research question number 5: should DoD 
continue to pursue a reduction in the “tail” of all its 
programs? 
DoD should continue to pursue cost reductions in all 
of its programs and activities.  William J. McCord, founder 
of the McCord consulting group on lean thinking, aptly 
stated that “businesses are much like a three-legged stool, 
with legs consisting of Process, People, and Technology. 
Ignore one of these legs, and the entire stool falls.” 
[Ref. 25]  DoD should not place too much emphasis on 
labeling costs but instead should concentrate on applicable 
“best business” practices, that increase efficiency and 
reduce the total costs of attaining DoD’s desired outcomes.  
It is important to note that not all “best business” 
practices are directly transferable from the corporate 
world to DoD. 
A common misnomer in today’s society is that “tooth” 
is more important than “tail.”  However, from an anatomical 
perspective using the Tyrannosaurus, one of the biggest 
meat eating dinosaurs, as an example; it is clear to see 
that both “tooth” and “tail” play a major role in operating 
efficiency.  “The Tyrannosaurus… had powerful jaws, with 
sharp 7 inch teeth, well designed for eating other 
dinosaurs. It could use its long tail for balance when 
attacking other dinosaurs.” [Ref. 22] 
This same concept is well summarized by SecDef Donald 
Rumsfeld "we do not want to reduce [staff] levels to the 
point that we damage our effectiveness from a military 
standpoint;" and Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of 
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff "there’s a lot of what we call 
tail that we can’t go to war without." [Ref. 58]  
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis developed a new concept, “Tail to Tooth 
Continuum” for evaluating which assets are “tooth” and 
which are “tail.”  The QDR requires that DoD provide a 
ratio of combat forces to support forces.  Future research 
could examine the application of this new concept to the 
existing MFP structure, to provide a less subjective 
measure of TTR.   
Another area of possible research is to redesign the 
mission/force categories and infrastructure categories 
using the “Tail to Tooth Continuum” concept.  
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 APPENDIX A 
Table A - 1, Department of Defense TOA by Force and Infrastructure 
Categories 
(FY 2003 $ in Billions) 
 
CATEGORY FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 
Forces           
Expeditionary Forces 124 127 129 135 137
Homeland Defense Forces 7 8 8 9 13
Other Forces 29 30 29 31 33
Defense Emergency Response Fund - - - - 16
Forces Total  160 166 166 175 199
Infrastructure 
Force Installations 20 21 23 23 25
Communications & Information 4 4 4 5 5
Science & Technology Program 9 8 9 9 10
Acquisition 8 8 9 9 8
Central Logistics 17 17 20 18 19
Defense Health Program 19 18 19 22 25
Central Personnel Administration 10 9 10 10 10
Central Personnel Benefits Programs 8 8 8 8 9
Central Training 24 24 25 25 27
Departmental Management 15 16 15 15 14
Other Infrastructure 3 3 4 4 4
Infrastructure Total  136 138 145 148 154
Grand Total  295 304 311 323 353
Infrastructure as a % of total budget 46% 45% 47% 46% 44% 
Infrastructure as a % of total budget when
the DWCF portion of the infrastructure 
funded by mission programs is estimated as
25% of the total infrastructure. (GAO 
approach) 
60% 59% 61% 60% 57% 
Infrastructure as % of total budget when 
all DWCF orders (as reported by the DoD 
comptroller in Table A-4) are included as 
infrastructure. 
53% 52% 53% 52% 50% 
Infrastructure as % of total budget when 
DWCF orders (as reported by the DoD 
comptroller in Table A-4) are allocated 
between forces and infrastructure. 
50% 49% 50% 49% 47% 
After FY 2003 President's Budget and associated FYDP with Institute for Defense 
Analyses normalization adjustments. 
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Table A - 2, Department of Defense TOA by Major Force Programs Assuming 
6 MFPs as “Combat Forces Programs” 
(FY 2003 $ in Billions) 
 
Major Force Program FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 
Combat Forces Programs      
Strategic Forces 8 8 8 7 8
General Purpose Forces 104 109 111 120 121
C3I & Space 34 35 37 38 39
Mobility Forces 12 13 13 11 12
Guard & Reserve Forces 25 26 25 26 27
Special Operations Forces 4 4 4 3 4
Combat Forces Programs Total 186 194 198 206 212
Infrastructure  
Research & Development 29 29 30 31 36
Central Supply & Maintenance 18 19 22 20 21
Training Medical & Other GP Activities 52 51 52 56 59
Administration & Associates Activities 9 9 9 9 25
Support to Other Nations 1 1 1 1 1
Infrastructure Total 109 109 114 117 141
Grand Total 295 304 311 323 353
Infrastructure as a % of total budget 37% 36% 37% 36% 40% 
Infrastructure as a % of total budget when 
the DWCF portion of the infrastructure 
funded by mission programs is estimated as 
20% to 25% of the total infrastructure. 
(GAO approach) 
48% 47% 48% 47% 52% 
Infrastructure as % of total budget when 
all DWCF orders (as reported by the DoD 
comptroller in Table A-4) are included as 
infrastructure. 
43% 42% 43% 43% 46% 
Infrastructure as % of total budget when 
DWCF orders (as reported by the DoD 
comptroller in Table A-4) are allocated 
between forces and infrastructure. 
41% 40% 40% 40% 44% 
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Table A - 3, Department of Defense TOA by Major Force Programs Assuming 
only 3 MFPs as “Combat Forces Programs” 
(FY 2003 $ in Billions) 
 
Major Force Program FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 
Combat Forces Programs      
Strategic Forces 8 8 8 7 8
General Purpose Forces 104 109 111 120 121
Special Operations Forces 4 4 4 3 4
Combat Forces Programs Total 116 120 123 131    133
Infrastructure  
C3I & Space 34 35 37 38 39
Mobility Forces 12 13 13 11 12
Guard & Reserve Forces 25 26 25 26 27
Research & Development 29 29 30 31 36
Central Supply & Maintenance 18 19 22 20 21
Training Medical & Other GP Activities 52 51 52 56 59
Administration & Associates Activities 9 9 9 9 25
Support to Other Nations 1 1 1 1 1
Infrastructure Total 179 184 188 193 220
Grand Total 295 304 311 323 353
Infrastructure as a % of total budget 61% 60% 61% 60% 62% 
Infrastructure as a % of total budget when 
the DWCF portion of the infrastructure 
funded by mission programs is estimated as 
20% to 25% of the total infrastructure. 
(GAO approach) 
79% 79% 79% 77% 81% 
Infrastructure as % of total budget when 
all DWCF orders (as reported by the DoD 
comptroller in Table A-4) are included as 
infrastructure. 
67% 67% 67% 66% 68% 
Infrastructure as % of total budget when 
DWCF orders (as reported by the DoD 
comptroller in Table A-4) are allocated 
between forces and infrastructure. 
61% 61% 61% 60% 63% 
After National Defense Budgets Estimates for FY 2003 
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Table A - 4, Defense-Wide Working Capital Fund FY 2003 Budget 
Estimates, Orders from DoD Components 
(FY 2003 $ in Millions) 
Service or Agency FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 
Army 4,284.2 4,411.6 4,344.8 
Navy 5,260.7 5,405.2 5,199.6 
Air Force 6,172.2 6,523.8 6,100.5 
Marine Corps 563.1 604.1 613.7 
Other 1,967.0 1,549.9 1,705.6 
Orders from Other Fund Activity Groups 2,443.1 2,663.4 2,825.5 





Table A - 5, Department of Defense Active-Duty Military and Civilian 
Manpower by Force and Infrastructure Categories  
(in thousands) 
 
CATEGORY FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 
Forces           
Expeditionary Forces 800 788 796 804 826
Homeland Defense Forces 31 30 29 28 29
Other Forces 61 60 59 60 66
Forces Total  893 878 884 892 921
Infrastructure 
Force Installations 188 186 173 171 157
Communications & Information 29 28 24 25 24
Science & Technology Program 17 16 15 15 16
Acquisition 110 105 98 97 98
Central Logistics 204 189 182 176 174
Defense Health Program 142 134 127 129 130
Central Personnel Administration 86 64 91 93 86
Central Personnel Benefits Programs 48 48 48 49 48
Central Training 297 316 298 298 273
Departmental Management 123 124 119 117 116
Other Infrastructure 19 15 22 12 18
Infrastructure Total  1,262 1,227 1,198 1,182 1,140
Grand Total  2,155 2,105 2,082 2,074 2,061
Infrastructure as a % of total 
manpower 59% 58% 58% 57% 55%
After FY 2003 President's Budget and associated FYDP with Institute for Defense 
Analyses normalization adjustments. 
NOTE: Excludes National Guard and Reserve personnel. 
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Table A - 6, Active-Duty Military and Civilian Manpower by Services and 
by Force and Infrastructure Categories 
(in thousands)  
CATEGORY FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002
Army 
Forces 354 347 352 358 363
Infrastructure 367 359 352 342 333
Total Army 722 706 704 700 696
Infrastructure as % of Total 51% 51% 50% 49% 48% 
Navy 
Forces 199 194 196 200 208
Infrastructure 373 362 354 351 333
Total Navy 572 556 549 551 542
Infrastructure as % of Total 65% 65% 64% 64% 62% 
Air Force 
Forces 221 219 215 212 227
Infrastructure 321 310 304 304 291
Total Air Force 542 529 518 516 518
Infrastructure as % of Total 59% 59% 59% 59% 56% 
Marine Corps 
Forces 107 107 111 110 110
Infrastructure 87 87 83 83 82
Total Marine Corps 194 193 194 193 192
Infrastructure as % of Total 45% 45% 43% 43% 43% 
Defense Agency and Defense-Wide 
Forces 11 11 11 11 12
Infrastructure 114 109 105 103 101
Total Defense Agency and DW 126 120 116 113 112
Infrastructure as % of Total 91% 91% 91% 90% 90% 
Grand Total    2,155    2,105    2,082   2,074  2,061
After FY 2003 President's Budget and associated FYDP with Institute for 
Defense Analyses normalization adjustments. 
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 APPENDIX B 


























Hand-to-hand 23 23 4.6 2.3 1.2 0.9 0.09 0.008 0.006 
Javelin 19 19        
Ordinary bow 21 21        
Longbow 36 36 7.2 3.6      
Crossbow 33 33 6.6       
Arquebus 10  2.0       




 8.6 4.3 2.2 1.7    
Early 19th C 
rifle 
36 




    4.1    
Late 19th C 
rifle 
153 




     1.98 0.17 0.12 
WW I machine 
gun 
3,463 
     13.85 1.15 0.87 
WW II machine 
gun 
4,973 
      1.66 1.24 
16th C 12-pdr 
cannon 
43 
43 8.6       
17th C 12-pdr 
cannon 
224 




  94.0 47.0 37.6    
French 75mm gun 386,530      1546.1 128.8 96.6 
155mm GPF 912,428      3,649.7 304.1 228.1 




      393.6 295.2 
WW I tank 34,636      138.5 11.5  
WW II medium 
tank 
935,458 
      311.8 233.9 
WW I fighter 
bomber 
31,909 
     127.6 10.6  
WW II fighter 
bomber 
1,245,789 













      231,795.0 173,846.3 
[After Ref. 9, Table 7, p. 313] 
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1 5 10 20 25 250 3000 4000 
Weapons  Normalized OLI Values 
Hand-to-hand 4,000.0 800.0 400.0 200.0 160.0 16.0 1.3 1.0 
Javelin 3,304.3        
Ordinary bow 3,652.2        
Longbow 6,260.9 1,252.2 626.1      
Crossbow 5,739.1 1,147.8       
Arquebus  347.8       
17th C musket  660.9       
18th C 
flintlock 
 1,495.7 747.8 373.9 299.1    
Early 19th C 
rifle 
  626.1 313.0 250.4    
Mid-19th C 
rifle 
    709.6    
Late 19th C 
rifle 
    1,064.3 106.4 8.9  
Springfield 
1903 rifle 
     344.3 28.7 21.5 
WW I machine 
gun 
     2,409.0 200.8 150.6 
WW II machine 
gun 
      288.3 216.2 
16th C 12-pdr 
cannon 
7,478.3 1,495.7       
17th C 12-pdr 
cannon 
 7,791.3 3,895.7      
Gribeauval 12-
pdr cannon 
  16,347.8 8,173.9 6,539.1    
French 75mm 
gun 
     268,890.4 22,407.5 16,805.7 
155mm GPF      634,732.5 52,894.4 39,670.8 
105mm Howitzer       36,940.0 27,705.0 
155mm “Long 
Tom” 
      68,445.3 51,334.0 
WW I tank      24,094.6 2,007.9  
WW II medium 
tank 
      54,229.4 40,672.1 
WW I fighter 
bomber 
     22,197.6 1,849.8  
WW II fighter 
bomber 
      72,219.7 54,164.7 
V-2 ballistic 
missile 
      193,528.7 145,146.5 
20KT nuclear 
airburst 




      40,312,173.9 30,234,130.4 
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SOFs PRINCIPAL MISSIONS  
SOFs are organized, trained, and equipped specifically 
to accomplish their assigned roles, as described below, in 
nine mission areas: 
1. Counterproliferation (CP) – combat proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons across the 
full range of U.S. efforts, including the 
application of military power to protect U.S. forces 
and interests; intelligence collection and analysis; 
and support of diplomacy, arms control, and export 
controls. Accomplishment of these activities may 
require coordination with other U.S. government 
agencies 
2. Combating terrorism (CBT) – preclude, preempt, and 
resolve terrorist actions throughout the entire 
threat spectrum, including antiterrorism (defensive 
measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist 
acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken 
to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), and 
resolve terrorist incidents when directed by the NCA 
or the appropriate unified commander or requested by 
the Services or other government agencies 
3. Foreign internal defense (FID) – organize, train, 
advise, and assist host-nation military and 
paramilitary forces to enable these forces to free 
and protect their society from subversion, 
lawlessness, and insurgency 
4. Special reconnaissance (SR) – conduct reconnaissance 
and surveillance actions to obtain or verify 
information concerning the capabilities, intentions, 
and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to 
secure data concerning characteristics of a 
particular area 
5. Direct action (DA) – conduct short-duration strikes 
and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, 
destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on 
designated personnel or materiel 
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6. Psychological operations (PSYOP) – induce or 
reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable 
to the originator’s objectives by conducting planned 
operations to convey selected information to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior 
of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals 
7. Civil affairs (CA) – facilitate military operations 
and consolidate operational activities by assisting 
commanders in establishing, maintaining, 
influencing, or exploiting relationships between 
military forces and civil authorities, both 
governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian 
population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area 
of operation 
8. Unconventional warfare (UW) – organize, train, 
equip, advise, and assist indigenous and surrogate 
forces in military and paramilitary operations 
normally of long duration 
9. Information operations (IO) – actions taken to 
achieve information superiority by affecting 
adversary information and information systems while 
defending one’s own information and information 
systems  
SOFs COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES  
Based on their unique capabilities, SOFs are 
frequently tasked to participate in the following 
activities: 
 
1. Coalition support – integrate coalition units into 
multinational military operations by training 
coalition partners on tactics and techniques and 
providing communications 
 
2. Combat search and rescue (CSAR) – penetrate air 
defense systems and conduct joint air, ground, or sea 
operations deep within hostile or denied territory, at 
night or in adverse weather, to recover distressed 
personnel during wartime or contingency operations. 
SOFs are equipped and manned to perform CSAR in 
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support of SOFs missions only. SOFs perform CSAR in 
support of conventional forces on a case-by-case basis 
not to interfere with the readiness or operations of 
core SOFs missions. 
 
3. Counterdrug (CD) activities – train host-nation CD 
forces and domestic law enforcement agencies on 
critical skills required to conduct individual and 
small-unit operations in order to detect, monitor, and 
interdict the cultivation, production, and trafficking 
of illicit drugs targeted for use in the United States 
 
4. Humanitarian demining (HD) activities – reduce or 
eliminate the threat, to noncombatants and friendly 
military forces, posed by mines and other explosive 
devices by training host-nation personnel in their 
recognition, identification, marking, and safe 
destruction; provide instruction in program 
management, medical, and mine-awareness activities 
 
5. Humanitarian assistance (HA) – provide assistance of 
limited scope and duration to supplement or complement 
the efforts of host-nation civil authorities or 
agencies to relieve or reduce the results of natural 
or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such 
as human pain, disease, hunger, or deprivation that 
might present a serious threat to life or that can 
result in great damage to, or loss of, property 
 
6. Security assistance (SA) – provide training assistance 
in support of legislated programs which provide U.S. 
defense articles, military training, and other 
defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or 
cash sales in furtherance of national policies or 
objectives 
 
7. Special activities – subject to limitations imposed by 
Executive Order and in conjunction with a presidential 
finding and congressional oversight, plan and conduct 
actions abroad in support of national foreign policy 
objectives so that the role of the U.S. government is 
not apparent or acknowledged publicly 
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ORGANIZATION, FORCE STRUCTURE AND BASIC FUNCTIONS OF THE US 
SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES  
The following paragraphs describe the organization, 
force structure and basic functions of the SOFs’ different 
Commands, headquarters, Service Components and Joint 
Special Commands as presented in the year 2000 Posture 
Statement of the United States Special Operations Forces 
[Ref. 56] 
Commander in Chief US Special Operations Command 
All SOFs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, based in 
the United States, are under USCOMSOC’s combatant command. 
USSOCOM’s service component commands are the Army Special 
Operations Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, and 
the Air Force Special Operations Command. The Joint Special 
Operations Command is a sub-unified command of USCOMSOC. 
[Ref. 56, p. 46] 
USCOMSOC receives the support of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force who provide qualified personnel, common 
equipment, base operations support, logistical sustainment, 
and core skills training. This support allows USCOMSOC to 
focus on SOFs-specific training and equipment, as well as 
the integration of SOFs into the entire range of military 
operations. [Ref. 56, p. 12] 
Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command (HQ 
USSOCOM)  
USSOCOM headquarters staff is configured into five 
functional centers.  The following sub-sections present a 
brief description of each center.  
Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL) Center  
The SOAL combines the acquisition and the 
logistics functions of the command (J-4).  It provides 
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research, development, acquisition, and logistics support 
to USCOMSOC. The SOAL plans, directs, reviews, and 
evaluates materiel development, procurement, and 
sustainment for USSOCOM; conducts liaison with USSOCOM 
components to ensure operational requirements are met by 
developmental programs; develops and promulgates USSOCOM 
acquisition and logistics policies and procedures; and 
manages a select group of special operations-peculiar 
programs. 
Benefits derived from this organization include: 
- Cradle-to-grave management of SOFs-related 
systems 
- Improved life-cycle cost management 
- Portfolio and materiel management 
- Elimination of organizational stove pipes or 
barriers to collaboration 
- Worldwide logistic support of SOFs Special 
Operations 
Requirements and Resources (SORR) Center 
The SORR combines the planning (J-5 and J-7) and 
resourcing (J-8) functions, to include the USSOCOM 
Strategic Planning Process. The mission of the SORR is to 
support SOFs through the development of resourcing, 
operational mission and force structure analysis, strategic 
assessments, and requirements reviews. 
Operations, Plans, and Policy (SOOP) Center 
The SOOP combines the J-3 and the J-5 staffs to 
provide focused operational support in the areas of 
doctrine, plans, policy, operations, training, and special 
actions. Its mission is to ensure all special operations 
deployments and plans supporting the NCA, regional 
Combatant Commanders, and Ambassadors are tailored to 
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mission requirements, reflect current force capabilities, 
and are consistent with USCOMSOC Title 10 responsibilities 
and core missions. In support of these objectives, the SOOP 
oversees SOFs doctrine, education, tempo, and remediation, 
as well as the training and exercise programs, in order to 
optimize force readiness and SOFs relevance. 
The SOOP also develops joint plans, policy, 
strategic assessments, and force structure, and directs 
deployment, employment, and readiness of approximately 
46,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force SOFs worldwide, including 
sensitive special mission units; validates operational 
requirements; and manages training resources, humanitarian 
programs, joint training exercises, and operational 
testing. 
Intelligence and Information Operations (SOIO) 
Center 
The SOIO combines the J-2 and J-6 staff functions 
to provide for integrated information management in 
intelligence, communications, information protection, 
network management, and audio/ visual support. SOIO 
integrates command and control, communications, computer, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and 
information operations (IO) to gain information superiority 
throughout the spectrum of engagement and conflict. The 
SOIO validates requirements and develops special operations 
C4ISR and IO training, doctrine, and procedures. 
Command Support (SOCS) Center 
Created from the remaining command functions, the 
SOCS is a process-oriented support center that provides 
personnel and special staff support to the headquarters and 
its components. The SOCS includes public affairs, executive 
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services, medical, chaplain, historian, equal opportunity, 
security, quality integration, engineering, protocol, 
headquarters command, and joint secretariat support 
services. The USSOCOM chief of staff directs the center. 
Service Components and Joint Special Commands 
 
U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)  
The Army special operations forces (ARSOF) 
include active, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve 
forces consisting of Special Forces, Rangers, special 
operations aviation, civil affairs (CA), psychological 
operations (PSYOP), and combat- and service-support units.  
Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces are organized 
to support naval and joint special operations within the 
theater unified command. These forces are organized, 
equipped, and trained to be highly mobile and quickly 
deployable.  
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)  
Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) are 
equipped with highly specialized, fixed and rotary-wing 
aircraft. AFSOC’s provide: SOFs mobility, forward presence 
and engagement, precision employment/strike, and 
information operations.  
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
A joint headquarters designed to study special 
operations requirements and techniques; ensure 
interoperability and equipment standardization; plan and 
conduct special operations exercises and training; and 
develop joint special operations tactics. 
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Theater Special Operations Commands 
The theater special operations commands (SOC), are 
responsible to the geographic Combatant Commanders for 
planning and conducting joint special operations in the 
theater, ensuring that SOFs capabilities are matched to 
mission requirements, exercising operational control of 
SOFs for joint special operations, and advising the 
Combatant Commanders and component commanders in theater on 
the proper employment of SOFs.  The USCOMSOC provides 
funding and personnel for the SOCs, but each SOC reports 
directly to the geographic Combatant Command. [Ref. 56, p. 
13] 
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